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[A]uthenticity is  implicitly a polemic concept, fulfilling its  nature by 
dealing aggressively with received and habitual opinion, aesthetic 
opinion in the first instance, social and political opinion in the next.
(Trilling 1972: 94.)
[S]ome signs, or past meanings, are possible to comprehend.
(Preucel and Mrozowski 2010: 31.)
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PROLOGUE
On archaeological knowledge, truth, and interpretation, and on the 
relationship between theory and data in archaeology1
Hedgehogs and foxes
In his  essay The hedgehog and the fox, Isaiah Berlin (1953), referring to a Greek poet 
Archilochus (c. 650 BC), divides people roughly into two types, hedgehogs and 
foxes. ‘The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing’2. Both 
types  of people build and base their knowledge and view of the world on the very 
things they know. Even though the fox is  very resourceful, he is powerless  in front 
of  the hedgehog’s one and only defense.
Even though, according to Berlin (1953: 2), this kind of division is very simple and 
even a bit ridiculous  and absurd, it contains enough truth to provide a setting or a 
starting-point for any kind of study or at least a bona fide examination, or 
‘genuine investigation’, as he writes.
Berlin’s study was about Tolstoi’s  philosophy of history but his classification serves 
my purposes well. Every archaeologist is, when interpreting his  or her research 
material, confronted with a task of explicating his or her view of the relationship 
between theory and data (i.e. empirical observations). Even though no explicit 
theory or model is utilized in his  or her study, the researcher should eventually (at 
least when writing a master’s thesis) have to explain his  or her standpoint on 
notions like knowledge, truth, and interpretation. Even if it were impossible to say 
anything positive or final about them, it is  most beneficial for the reader to know 
what the author thinks of  them.
1
1 The prologue has been published in Finnish in Marila 2011a.
2 Archilochus’ fragment 201, West 1971 in Berlin 2004.
In this chapter, I will present my view of knowledge, truth, and interpretation. In 
addition, I will give an example of the relationship between theory and data. My 
objective is  to approach the aforementioned concepts  by making brute 
distinctions. In relation to knowledge, I have divided people into pragmatists and 
rationalists. In relation to truth, I have divided them into realists and relativists. 
When it comes to interpretation, people can be divided into those who believe in 
historical meaning-making processes, and those who believe in non-historical 
meaning-making processes.
The topics in this chapter may appear banal and as absurd and ridiculous  as 
Berlin’s division of people into hedgehogs  and foxes. It is, however, best to 
approach the meaning of theory in archaeology by assessing the most profound 
concepts, and by making absurdly simple divisions. It is  the very simplicity where 
the power of this approach lies. This approach is also justified since the history of 
archaeology has always  been written by making simple distinctions. 
Historiographers  of archaeology like dividing researchers into processualists  and 
postprocessualists, realists and relativists, for example.
On knowledge
In the history of archaeology, and all human thought for that matter, there can be 
seen two distinct ways to think of knowledge. The first is usually referred to as 
rationalism. Even though René Descartes is  often blamed for inventing it 
(Descartes 2002; e.g. Olsen 2010: 64, 98), it is  hard to say how old this 
philosophical outlook is. It is undoubtedly as old as thinking itself. According to 
the maxim of rationalism, it is  possible to doubt all empirical knowledge. Only 
thinking (and therefore doubting) is the only certain entity the existence of which 
we need not nor should doubt. After all, there has  to exist a mind that senses  the 
real and false experiences. Rationalists  therefore think people have knowledge 
before experience. In archaeology this  would mean that research is  not necessarily 
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done from the researcher’s  own cultural background characteristic of his or her 
time, but independently of  all burden of  history.
The other way of thinking of knowledge is  often referred to as pragmatism. This 
way of thinking was made popular by scientist, philosopher, semiotician, 
mathematician, and logician Charles Peirce and his contemporaries during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century (Waal 2005: 1). A pragmatist thinks 
experience precedes all knowledge. Therefore, since we can only have knowledge 
that is based on experiences, it is pointless and unnecessary to categorically doubt 
all experiences systematically. Peirce called such doubting ‘paper’ doubting and 
despised Descartes' approach to knowledge (Misak 1991: 50). According to Peirce, 
it is  pointless  to doubt all knowledge just because some knowledge may be false 
(Misak 1991: 50). His  response to Descartes was as follows, ‘[l]et us not pretend to 
doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts’ (EP1: 28).3
The pragmatist’s approach to knowledge is characterized by a method of building 
a system of beliefs and justifying knowledge distinctive of that of the rationalist’s. 
Whereas a rationalist may base his or her system of knowledge on one or few 
small hypotheses, a pragmatist bases his  or her system of knowledge on many 
small hypotheses. Built like this, a system will be more resistant in situations where 
one or more hypotheses  are falsified. A system that is based on big hypotheses is 
more likely to collapse if  even one of  the founding hypotheses becomes falsified.
A pragmatist does  not want to base his  or her system of knowledge on big 
hypotheses, but will acknowledge the basis  of all beliefs to be in a system of many 
small hypotheses  dictated and continually shaped by new experience and new 
knowledge.
3
3 EP1 refers to Houser and Kloesel 1992.
On truth
When speaking of knowledge, Berlin’s distinction is  somewhat clear; hedgehogs 
are rationalists, whereas  foxes can no doubt be classified as  pragmatists. People can 
be divided into hedgehogs and foxes also when it comes to knowing the truth. The 
matter becomes  somewhat complicated when we can, on the one hand, identify 
realists  who believe in one objective truth as hedgehogs, but on the other hand, 
relativists who believe in one subjective truth can also be identified as hedgehogs. 
Berlin’s choice for Tolstoi as the subject of his study is  interesting since Tolstoi can, 
in his nihilistic and pessimistic view of history, be identified as  a fox, who does not 
believe it to be possible to say anything true about history. Even though Tolstoi 
saw things to be predestined and thought the individual will ultimately have very 
little, if any, historical significance or power in making decisions, he thought 
everything is more complicated than anyone can understand (Berlin 2004: 123, 
126-127). In this sense Tolstoi can be seen as a hedgehog, who believed the 
universe to function as  a unity of which certain ‘truths’ (however abstracted, 
arbitrary, and ultimately untrue) can be averred since all knowledge is  based on 
experiences, but it must not be done by believing blindly in the all-explaining 
nature of  natural sciences (Berlin 1953: 73; 2004: 119-121).
Peirce’s  view of truth was a realist one (EP1: 120). He thought there is  nothing 
that has a starting-point, and all meaning is  necessarily historical. To Peirce, the 
world is a unity in which all meanings are interconnected. In his  philosophy, reality 
is  what it is, regardless of what you, me, or anyone else may think about it (Waal 
2001: 64). The conduct of inquiry is the process  of seeking the truth. The truth 
therefore can ultimately, at the end of the hypothetical day, be reached, but it is 
only a final opinion of a group of scientists  whose object reality is  (e.g. Misak 
1991: 80-81). The final opinions  reached by inquiry do not necessarily match 
reality, which, to us, remains necessarily anthropomorphic.
When the inquiry is conducted far enough, certain truths can be averred about the 
past. The real past, however, will most likely remain unknowable, since some 
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events  will, according to Peirce, remain ‘buried secrets’4. Buried secrets will remain 
unanswered even if  the inquiry was carried on forever.
On meaning and interpretation
The way one experiences history has the most profound significance when making 
interpretations of the meanings  of past events. In this  distinction, dividing thinkers 
into hedgehogs  and foxes becomes  even harder. Both can be found among those 
who believe meaning is  based on relations  of things  solely in the present, as  well as 
among those who think meaning is  based on historicity. Those who believe in 
diachronic, i.e. historical meaning-making practices  can be identified as foxes, but 
the fact that they believe in a historical unity makes  them hedgehogs. Also those 
who believe in synchronic meaning formation can be identified as foxes. They 
believe meaning is  formed in a horizontal meaning-making horizon. What 
distinguishes  synchronism from diachronism is  that in the former meaning is 
continually being reevaluated and cannot be justified with historical ‘facts’.
It is  fairly easy to describe Descartes' thinking as  characteristic of a hedgehog, 
whereas  Peirce would no doubt seem to be a fox who combines  data from various 
fields  of science open-mindedly. Both, however, strived for a systematic approach 
to forming a coherent structure in which all experience, knowledge, and meaning 
could be justified. In this they succeeded. It is  therefore by no means totally clear if 
Peirce was ultimately a hedgehog or a fox. Defining him as either is as hard as 
Berlin said it to be to define Tolstoi. It, then, so often happens that a fox only 
thinks  he or she is  a fox, whereas historiography could eventually categorize them 
as hedgehogs.
5
4 For a concise account of  buried secrets and Peirce’s view of  truth, see Misak 1991.
On the relationship between theory and data
Above, I presented my view of the basic and underlying concepts  important when 
discussing theory in research and particularly in archaeology. I divided people 
roughly into two categories; hedgehogs and foxes. Even though in the end it is 
hard to say which researchers are hedgehogs  and which are foxes, it appears 
possible to divide them into different types  of hedgehogs who believe in one 
personal truth, and different types  of foxes who believe in one objective truth, or 
one world and many world philosophers, as  proposed by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen 
(2011).
In order for this  account on knowledge, truth, and interpretation to be more than 
trivialities, it is most important to clarify what theory means  in research. It has 
become somewhat a proverb in archaeology to state that theory and data are 
inseparable. This  notion is indeed valid, but it remains a bit ambivalent, and does 
not provide a starting-point for a genuine investigation. It is  necessary to approach 
the problem by providing an absurd example:
The relationship between theory and data could be compared to seeing. I look 
around in a room, make observations, and collect data. I memorize certain details 
that are important or significant to me. Some details, in fact most of the 
information, I ignore or simply do not observe.
I close my eyes and think about what I saw in the room. What color was the 
bookshelf ? Was  it brown like the one my parents had when I was little? I think 
that bookshelf was light brown. Every time I open my eyes, I see the bookshelf a 
little bit differently (which happens also when writing and reviewing a master’s 
thesis like the one I am writing at the moment). Also my memories seem to change 
a little. New observations  and new data affect my theory on bookshelves. I have an 
image of a bookshelf that I see when I close my eyes. Still, when I keep my eyes 
open, I can recognize an object as  a bookshelf, and I can distinguish one bookshelf 
from another.
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The objects  in the room appear to be real, but they seem to change constantly. 
The same phenomenon can be seen when interpreting archaeological material. 
An archaeologist makes  observations  of material the maker’s  motives  of which he 
or she has no certain knowledge. The archaeologist, nevertheless, makes 
hypotheses that are based on his or her own theory on material culture, his or her 
motives  and values, his  or her way of looking at the world. The source of this 
theory is the material world, experience, and life. Charles Peirce once said, already 
at the age of  fifteen, that life is a theory.
How to read this master’s thesis
This  master’s thesis is  a study of the concept of authenticity, both in philosophy 
and archaeology. Having been written in essay form, it is  divided into a prologue 
and five chapters:
Prologue
I Introduction
II Authenticity in philosophy
III Authenticity in archaeology
IV Authenticity as semiosis
and
V Discussion
The prologue can be read as a theory part that explicates the writer’s approach to 
the topic, which occasionally rests on rough generalization and divisionalizing, but 
only so to provide a viable starting-point for approaching such a difficult and 
ambivalent concept as authenticity. The prologue also provides an introduction to 
some of the basic concepts  used in the following chapters, the two most important 
of  them being interpretation and meaning.
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Chapter I, introduction, is, as  its  name implies, an introduction to the concept of 
authenticity. It particularly addresses  the questions discussed in chapter III, 
authenticity in archaeology, but also presents the main questions this thesis aims to 
answer.
Chapter II, authenticity in philosophy, presents  the two main philosophical 
outlooks that have influenced and affected archaeology most. Modern archaeology 
is a product of modernity, whereas  postprocessual archaeology is  more connected 
to postmodernism. Chapter II also serves as an introduction to chapter III, which 
deals partly with issues of  modernity and postmodernism.
Chapter III, authenticity in archaeology, forms the core of this thesis. In this 
chapter, I provide an account of how the concept of authenticity has been 
understood in modern archaeology (or archaeological literature), particularly in 
postmodern postprocessual archaeology which, in this  thesis, is  implicitly 
presented as popular archaeology.5  It also issues the question of demarcating between 
scientific archaeology and popular archaeology. The main thesis in this  chapter is, 
that the contemporary postprocessual understanding of authenticity as contextual 
is not valid.
Chapter IV, authenticity as semiosis, continues where chapter III ends. In this 
chapter I argue that authenticity is ultimately the same as  meaning. Meaning in 
turn is  not entirely social, but has its  basis  in the material realm, in materiality. I 
use Charles  Peirce’s  theory of sign to illustrate that meaning, and authenticity, is  a 
semiotic process that manifests as semiosis (often also referred to as semeiosis).
In chapter V, discussion, I provide a brief discussion of the concept of authenticity 
in archaeology and the implications of using a Peircean theory to define 
8
5  Eero Muurimäki (2007: 98) puts  it well when he explicates  Cornelius Holtorf ’s view of the 
relationship between popular culture and scientific archaeology. ‘For Holtorf, archaeology in popular 
culture means every context but scientific where the word archaeology is used in public. But, when scientific 
archaeology also gets its meaning in the service of popular culture, all that is left is popular archaeology in the last 
instance.’
authenticity. In addition, I argue that, in archaeology, Peircean pragmatism can be 
seen as a synthesis  of processual and postprocessual archaeologies, and I go as  far 
as  proposing a pragmatistic archaeology as the possibility of a new scientific 
archaeology.
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I
INTRODUCTION
The type of  authenticity discussed in this master’s thesis
I became interested in the problem of authenticity already in the beginning of my 
studies in 2007 after having read Cornelius  Holtorf ’s  (2005) book From Stonehenge to 
Las Vegas - Archaeology as popular culture. His  approach to archaeology was, and still 
is, radical and innovative. For Holtorf, the appeal of archaeology lies  in its 
metaphorical nature. Archaeology deals  with very potent notions of being buried, 
going underground, doing detective work and going on an adventure. According 
to Holtorf, it is not the real pastness of archaeological sites or artifacts that is 
important to people, but the experiences and strong emotions they are capable of 
arising; the magic of doing archaeology and imagining the past. Therefore, in the 
postprocessual spirit, the authenticity of an artefact is not thought to be inherent 
to the object, but is always  experienced by an individual in a context. This allows 
for an authentic experience of the past in theme parks, TV, and popular culture. 
In fact, for Holtorf, archaeology is popular culture. (Holtorf  2005: 159.)
In this introductory chapter, I will describe what authenticity has  traditionally 
meant in archaeology, how its relevance was challenged in and after the beginning 
of the 1980s by some archaeologists, and how the division between two traditions 
in scientific archaeology also marks the bifurcation of two lines in the treatment of 
the concept of authenticity. I will also explicate some of the essential notions like 
the distinction between historical and metaphorical authenticity, and context and 
convention.
Determining the authenticity of archaeological artifacts  or ancient sites  has always 
been an important task of the archaeologist, or anyone studying the past for that 
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matter. Traditionally6 in archaeology the notion of authenticity has based on the 
idea, and been used with reference to, of a real past as it  once happened 
regardless  of what you, me, or anyone else may think about it. The notion of 
authentic past was reserved for the positivist, and most of all, scientific (Western) 
representation of the past. With its  critique against the so-called New archaeology, 
postprocessualism targeted the, in their view, false idea of one true and therefore 
authentic past envisioned by archaeologists hitherto.
Lately archaeologists  have been more preoccupied with a different kind of notion 
of authenticity. One that is  more deeply rooted to multiple alternative ways of 
experiencing the past and the pastness of things rather than determining the real past of 
artifacts or sites. The concept of authenticity has been extended to landscapes (see 
for example Palang and Fry 2003) and even theme parks  (Holtorf 2005, 2007; 
Ikäheimo 2010). People today want authentic experiences, at their local nearby 
historical site, and when traveling abroad and experiencing other cultures and 
cities.
Authenticity, when taken to mean something other than simple nominal authenticity, 
is  one of those highly ambivalent and hard to grasp concepts  that, despite their 
ambiguous  nature, have a great relevance on the way people assign meaning to 
things. Nominal authenticity is  a term used in art history. It refers to the process of 
linking a certain work of art to a particular author. I have deliberately taken this 
term and used it in this  context to refer to the technical authenticity of a certain 
artifact of archaeological site. This kind of authenticity is  relevant when 
determining whether the artifact or a site is genuine, i.e. not a reproduction or 
fake, but also when studying the meaning of  objects (see chapter IV).
11
6 With tradition I  refer to the fact that archaeology has always been inspired by the positivist notion 
of knowing the real, and authentic,  past.  This  view was  only challenged in the beginning of the 
1980s when the so-called postprocessual archaeology started stressing the relevance of the present 
context of the scientist studying the past and proposed that everyone’s perception of the past is 
equally valid and real,  therefore compromising the archaeologists’ monopolistic position in/to 
studying the past.
While often acknowledged as a modern phenomenon ‘invented’ to alleviate the 
stress the modern and individualistic world has placed upon humans (e.g. Taylor 
1992: 2; Holtorf and Schadla-Hall 1999: 231), the need for authenticity remains  a 
widely discussed topic even today. One recent example of this discussion is  the so-
called Holtorf-Kristiansen debate (Holtorf 2008; Kristiansen 2008). Kristian 
Kristiansen comments on Cornelius Holtorf ’s  (2005) book  From Stonehenge to Las 
Vegas - Archaeology as popular culture:
[--] Holtorf sets out to deconstruct some of the foundations of 
archaeological heritage: the notions of authenticity (chapter 7) and of 
preservation  (chapter 8). While I welcome a theoretical discussion of 
the various approaches to  authenticity in modern society, Holtorf ’s 
goal becomes obvious  when you read the next  chapter. By declaring 
that perceived ‘pastness’ is more important than real past it 
becomes easier to defend his  attack on archaeological preservation in 
chapter 8. This chapter is  full of misunderstandings and Holtorf is 
ignorant of the most basic information about  archaeological 
preservation, some of which I have pointed out earlier in print and 
verbally  to Cornelius  Holtorf, but apparently to no effect [--]. 
This may come as  no surprise as academic expertise is  superfluous  in 
his brave new archaeological world. (Kristiansen 2008: 489.)
In his book, Cornelius Holtorf (2005: 115) states that ‘[d]espite the theoretical 
difficulties  in defining it, authenticity is  arguably the single most important 
property of archaeological finds  and exhibits’. It is  not the definition of 
authenticity they are discussing, but the consequences of labeling authenticity as 
irrelevant or relative and contextual when it comes to experiencing archaeological 
artifacts and heritage sites. Kristiansen is  deeply worried about Holtorf ’s  ‘attempt 
to deconstruct archaeology as  a historical discipline in order to allow modern 
market forces  to take over the archaeological heritage and the consumption of the 
past as popular culture’ (Kristiansen 2008: 488).
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It is, however, not only the uncertain future of cultural heritage Kristiansen is 
worried about. Authenticity is also very closely tied to authority and power. 
Archaeologists  have always had a more or less authoritative disposition in defining 
what is  authentic and therefore worth saving and protecting. According to Holtorf 
(2005: 159), archaeologists should not be telling other people what to think about 
the past. If non-archaeologists  are allowed access to defining the authenticity of 
archaeological artifacts  and heritage sites, everybody becomes  an archaeologists. 
In fact, Holtorf  (2005: 160) has explicitly proposed that ‘we are all archaeologists’.
Defining authenticity in any way will have ramifications beyond mere theoretical 
discussion. What is considered real and authentic will affect the way we value 
things (Gilmore and Pine 2007), and, in the case of archaeology, the cultural 
heritage. If the modern market forces  are allowed to take over archaeological 
heritage, like Kristiansen envisioned in his  response to Holtorf, the past will be 
rendered a product that can be used to make a profit. In a way selling your own 
past would mean selling yourself, and that is unethical in the individualistic 
Western culture (Taylor 1992).
This  goes  to show that authenticity has  been approached and treated in many 
different ways  in archaeology, and it is my view that none of the approaches  has 
produced an adequate explanation of the concept. The recent trend has been to 
label authenticity contextual, which has  led to the treatment of the concept as 
highly ambiguous. Since one of the central objectives of this  master’s  thesis is to 
provide a clear distinction between context and convention, and explain how the 
authentic experience is  based on conventions  rather than context, let me now 
propose one such distinction.
When, at a museum exhibition, I say ‘this particular stone axe is authentic’ I may 
refer to a stone axe in relation to other stone axes  which, to me, look like fakes. 
Therefore I perceive the authenticity of the axe in question as a contextual 
attribute, i.e. the same axe can be taken to be authentic or inauthentic depending 
on its relation to other elements in the same context. However, when I visit the 
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same exhibition with my friend, who does not know stone axes  as  well as  I do, we 
could both utter the same sentence and point at a different axe. In this  case both 
our propositions are true because we are both perceiving the authenticity of the 
axe in relation to our conventions (acquired habits), not simply in relation to other 
axes. 
It is  my view that two kinds  of authenticity exist, one of historical, and the other 
of a metaphorical kind. Let me make that distinction clear. Historical authenticity 
could be described as  the artifacts  ability to provide answers to questions regarding 
the past. In this  sense the context of a particular find is important. In order to be 
authentic, a historical (one that is  relevant to archaeologists  in the traditional 
sense) artifact has to be able to tell us  something about the past in the present 
(Shanks 1992: 19). There are multiple contexts intermixed and the artifact’s 
authenticity is  defined by its ability to depart from the present context (Shanks 
1992: 19), i.e. stand on its own, free from present values, in a sense. Metaphorical 
authenticity, on the other hand, is what makes  it possible for a reproduction of an 
authentic artifact to be authentic (e.g. a stone axe and a reproduction of it). The 
same process enables for an authentic experience of the past for example in theme 
parks where nothing actually old is needed in order to experience the past.
The kind of authenticity I am interested in emerged as a result of the linguistic 
turn in social sciences and anthropology in the 1970s  and in archaeology during 
the 1980s (Preucel and Mrozowski 2010: 11, 21). The same can be seen to have 
happened to context. Context has, of course, always been a central factor in 
archaeological inquiry but toward the end of the 1980s context acquired a new 
meaning when hermeneutics was more intensively integrated as  part of the 
practice of archaeological interpretation. Context was now seen to apply to much 
more than the original find context of  an object.
The new notions of context and authenticity need to be seen to reflect a change in 
attitude in archaeology. More emphasis was put on the context of the scientist 
studying the past than on the past as something real. If archaeology had hitherto 
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been inspired by positivist notions of natural sciences as true science, the 1980s 
saw the emergence of a set of theories  that drew their ideas from social sciences, 
literary studies, linguistics, and semiotics. In a sense archaeology became a science 
where ‘anything goes’ (Oestigaard 2004: 35). This may be one reason context and 
authenticity remain ambiguous concepts in archaeology.
The objectives of  this master’s thesis
One of the objectives of this master’s thesis  is  to evaluate how the concept of 
authenticity has been understood and used in what has been referred to as 
postprocessual archaeology (i.e. a set of archaeologies  or archaeological theories 
that deny the possibility of one real and therefore necessarily authentic past), and 
what kind of scientific or philosophical terrain the notion stems from. I will be 
using archaeology’s role in popular culture (popular archaeology) as  a specific and 
recurring example of discussion since it is one field of archaeology where the 
significance of authenticity has  been heavily questioned (e.g. Holtorf 2005). I will 
give examples of how the past is  experienced, reproduced, and ultimately made 
authentic; all notions stemming from postprocessual archaeology.
The contemporary notion of authenticity as contextual is  of particular interest to 
me. Therefore, in the course of the following sixty or so pages, I will argue that 
authenticity can be seen to operate on a metaphorical level, as well as on a level 
that is  based on material meanings and historicity. Authenticity therefore is  not 
only a construction that has truth value only in one context7, but a convention, a 
habit of acting that stems from the historical meaning-making practices, or 
materiality. This point is explicated in the final chapter Authenticity as semiosis 
(chapter IV), where I use Charles  Peirce’s  sign theory to make my point. 
Authenticity remains  an ambiguous concept due to lack of systematic treatment of 
it. I believe one systematic approach is provided by Peirce’s theory of  sign.
15
7 If  propositions were only true in one context, we would not need science (Klejn 1973: 701).
Besides archaeology, I have studied philosophy and semiotics. Therefore this 
master’s  thesis will present a somewhat philosophical approach to the concept of 
authenticity in archaeology. I will issue the two most important philosophical 
outlooks, modernity and postmodernism and clarify their significance to modern 
archaeology and postprocessualism in particular. Modernity and postmodernism 
will be addressed in chapter II.
Some important topics not included in this master’s thesis
It is, of course, impossible to cover all relevant topics  within a limited amount of 
pages. That is  why only certain themes I find relevant have been issued. These 
include philosophy and semiotics as a background or parallel evolutionary lines for 
postprocessual archaeology.
I have, however, not discussed some relevant topics. These include museology and 
architecture. Museology is, of course, a relevant topic because it deals with 
authenticity through exhibitions. I have, however, provided a chapter on 
experiencing the past, and I am most positive the same questions are of relevance 
in museology. There is  also a more pragmatic reason for leaving museology 
outside of this thesis; I have more competence in philosophy and semiotics which 
both provide ample material for studying authenticity.
Another important topic that has been left out is  architecture and the restoration 
of heritage sites. Ruins and their restoration are relevant questions when it comes 
to perceiving the authenticity of an object or a heritage site. I have, however, 
discussed notions  like aura, which is closely connected to the questions of 
restoration. Some suggested reading for architecture, restoration and ruins include 
The seven lamps of architecture by John Ruskin (1974), A history of architectural 
conservation by Jukka Jokilehto (1986) and, a more recent article by Gregory 
Jusdanis (2004), Farewell to the Classical: excavations in modernism which includes  an 
extensive bibliography.
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One regrettable aspect of this  thesis is that it does  not address the discussion of 
authenticity in Finnish archaeology. There is, however, a clear reason for this. 
There has  not been a theoretical discussion of authenticity in Finnish archaeology. 
It could even be averred that theory in general has  been avoided in Finnish 
archaeology (Herva 1999; Kärki et al. 2006: 55). Some refreshing exceptions, 
however, include for example Eero Muurimäki (2000), whose licentiate's  thesis 
deals with epistemology in archaeology.
One could also point out in disappointment that no case study is  provided in this 
thesis to put theories into use. This, I argue, is not necessary when discussing 
highly abstract concepts such as authenticity which, in the end, has its roots in the 
material world that surrounds us. In this respect, there is no essential difference 
between archaeological material and the rest of the material world we are 
surrounded by and are part of.8 
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8 These very same arguments are used by Bjørnar Olsen (2010: 17) in In defense of things, in which 
he does not apply his theories in a case study.
II
AUTHENTICITY IN PHILOSOPHY
Authenticity and modernity
Introduction
Authenticity is often seen as a product of the modern Western world and tied to 
the notion of modernity (e.g. Sherry 2007: 481). Western archaeology was 
developed from the same modern social background (Thomas 2004a, 2004b: 17; 
Lucas 2004: 109). Therefore in order to understand what authenticity means  in 
contemporary Western archaeology, it is  most beneficial first to try to understand 
what modernity means and what are the philosophical grounds modernity grew 
from.
In this chapter, I will explore the philosophical grounds that gave rise to what has 
been called modernity. I will also present some of the ‘malaises’ of modernity, 
which have been held responsible for the false modern notion of  authenticity.
Western scientific archaeology was developed in the modern philosophical 
atmosphere. Therefore the notion of authenticity in archaeology stems from the 
philosophical treatment of the notion. In addition to discussing the development 
of modernity, I will make recurring notions about its  significance to archaeology 
and anthropology and the treatment of the concept of authenticity in 
archaeology. Let me now begin with an introduction to modernity.
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What modernity is
Even though a concise description is impossible to give, modernity is  often seen as 
a development of a certain kind of philosophical outlook. Central to modernity 
are the emergence of nation-states, legal systems, capitalism, industrialization, 
urbanization, the constant feeling of change and the loss  of tradition. This in turn 
has lead to an emphasized idea of individuality and the notion of the present as 
radically different from the past. (Thomas 2004a: 2; 125-126.)
One can come up with many elements that characterize the modern era, but, of 
course, no certain boundaries  can be set around a block that could be called the 
modern era. It is  more beneficial to think of modernization as a process that has 
its roots  in ancient Greek and Rome (Thomas 2004a: 3). According to 
archaeologist Julian Thomas (2004a: 3), what made the modern period modern, is 
that a forgotten ‘cluster of understandings’ achieved a position of hegemony and 
people started to structure their lives according to a more global disposition of 
thinking. In this  way modernity is a philosophical outlook that draws  its ideas from 
enlightenment, rationalism, mechanism and positivism. The modern era is  a 
process  that strives  toward a final state of affairs  (Johnson 1999: 163-164; Thomas 
2004a: 3). The modern philosophy holds in it an idea of perfection that can be 
reached9.
Modernization is said to have brought with it a feeling of uncertainty and chaos 
(e.g. Hodder 1989b: 65). An integral part of the modern is therefore the 
‘legislative’ (Thomas 2004a: 3) nature of philosophy. Modern philosophy tries  to 
define good and bring order into chaos  (Bauman 1992: 119). There is an upheld 
distinction between reason and action. Abstract thinking is thought to precede 
action. They are, in fact, thought as separate. Modern life appears planned ahead. 
That is one reason utopian thinking is so distinctive of modernity (Bauman 1992: 
xv). This is  also a recurring theme when discussing the distinction between theory 
and practice in archaeology and other sciences.
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9 For more on utopia and dystopia, see also Shanks et al. 2004: 75-76.
Modernity gave birth to modern archaeology, and to archaeological thinking in 
general (Holtorf 2010b: 10; Thomas  2004a). What distinguishes antiquarianism 
from archaeology is that the former treated past objects  as mere objects in the 
present, whereas the latter approaches past material as evidence that is able to tell 
us something about the past when studied systematically (Schnapp 2008: 396; 
Thomas 2004a: 3, 157). 
The modern way of acknowledging the past life and past values as separate from 
those of the modern society of today has lead to a situation where past cultures 
are treated as blocks in time and space (Lucas 2004: 109)10. According to Thomas 
(2004a: 4), this is what still burdens archaeology. The tendency to think about the 
material (past and present) as  separate from the human is  a line of thought that 
has its roots in the mechanistic and rationalist philosophy distinctive of  modernity.
In archaeology this  philosophy has  been challenged only recently by such scholars 
as  Michael Shanks  (2007) and Bjørnar Olsen (2003, 2007, 2010). This approach 
has been labelled symmetrical archaeology since it acknowledges the symmetry of 
humans and material objects. Mind and matter are inseparable parts of the same 
spectrum. Symmetrical archaeology is  therefore based on a monist ontology, an 
ontology that has not been very influential in archaeology ever since the birth of 
modern scientific archaeology, but one that will most likely be a guiding 
philosophy or, if such vocabulary is allowed, at the heart of the next paradigm of 
archaeology.
Modernity brought with it a world of mass-production and mass-consumption 
that lead to an illusory view of the world (Olsen 2010: 11). Replicas  and machines 
filled the world and became ‘the incarnation of our inauthentic, estranged, and 
alienated modern being’ (Olsen 2010: 11). Things became what epitomize 
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10  Vincent Sherry (2007) has proposed that modernity means conceiving time in intervals of 
decades, a period relevant on the individual level.
inauthentic, while an idea of freedom and emancipation from things  was upheld 
(Latour 1993: 137-138, 2002: 138-139).
Things became a threat to the authentic, free, and individual human self. This in 
turn lead to a somewhat distorted image of the individual and the human as  the 
incorruptible constant. This philosophy that can be traced back to Protagoras 
whose famous  line ‘man is  the measure of all things’ can be seen to characterize a 
line of  thought that is over two millennia old.
The most notorious  and perhaps the most often blamed of the philosophers  that 
can be held responsible for creating a modern divide between humans  and the 
material world is René Descartes  (e.g. Jameson 2002: 31). In his view, the human is 
basically composed of thought and is  independent of all time and place, and all 
things material.
In Descartes’ reasoning, all experiences can and must be doubted. The same line 
of thought can also be seen in Immanuel Kant´s  philosophy. His  ontology denies 
all access  to things. Things are at best anthropomorphic abstractions which, 
nevertheless, ultimately remain transcendental, unattainable, and out of reach. In 
Kant’s  philosophy, knowledge is  not directly based on the object world. The world, 
however, is an object created by man.
It is no wonder things and the material world became evil things that were seen as 
humanism’s other  (Olsen 2010: 90-91). The dualistic philosophy combined with 
mass-production and replicating of things  raised issues  of alienation and 
inauthenticity. The material world became deceptive.
While modernism has often been said to have given birth to humanism (Olsen 
2010: 102), which can be seen to hold in it very noble notions of equality, 
solidarity, and hegemony, these attributes have nevertheless  been subjected only to 
humans. The material world, however, remains  unattached and distant, even 
malign and suspicious.
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Eugene Rochberg-Halton (1986: x) sees modernity as cultural nominalism. A 
philosophy that denies general ideas and universal attributes and is based on 
dichotomous abstractions such as conventional versus original, fact versus value, 
and social versus individual. Rochberg-Halton’s  objective is to reconstruct a 
pragmatist social theory that targets  such issues  as materialism and meaning. It is 
also an attempt to bring the notions of memory and continuity back to social 
theory, something that could well have been expected from a Peircean pragmatist 
interested in social theory in the postmodern times  of the 1980s. After all, Peirce 
was a realist (Waal 2001: 51).11
The Cartesian alienation from the material world gave birth to a project of upholding 
the idea of an authentic self, since there had to be something that could be taken 
to be the final cause of things, the original that is not a copy. Therefore one of the 
most central questions modernity raised was that of  individuality.
Individuality and other malaises of  the modern
In the previous chapter, I gave a brief introduction to what modernity is usually 
taken to mean. I also mentioned some of the key modern philosophers, the most 
well known of them being René Descartes, and explained their relevance to the 
modern understanding of the world. Their philosophy has since been upholding 
the binary conception of the world where the human and the material things  are 
seen as  separate (Harrison 2004: 36). This  has lead to the idea of the self as an 
autonomous, irreproducible, and authentic, individual. One philosophical school 
that has been identified with and been upholding the notion of authentic 
individual and authenticity is existentialism.
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11  The discussion of realism versus nominalism is  interesting. Peirce, however, avoided this by 
making a distinction between what is real and what exists.  Universals  may be real, but do not 
necessarily exist. Not all that is real, exists. Existence is the object’s  relation to other objects of its 
kind, whereas being real is the object’s relation to our thoughts about it. (Waal 2001: 51)
It must be noted that the introduction to existentialism provided here deals with 
early Heidegger and his  anthropocentric existentialism. Heidegger’s  philosophy is 
diverse and later becomes anti-humanist and anti-anthropocentric.12  In this 
respect Heidegger later criticizes subjectivism and idealism. Therefore my take on 
Heidegger should be read as a prelude to Adorno’s  critique of existentialism and 
the jargon of authenticity, not as criticism of Heidegger’s  philosophy, or 
existentialism for that matter.13
Existentialism
Paul Tillich (1944) describes existentialism as  an over one hundred (now closer to 
one hundred and fifty) year old movement of rebellion against the 
dehumanization of man in industrial society. While modernity can be seen to have 
given birth to a certain kind of humanism, it has alienated the human subject 
(remember the discussion of  modernity and humanism above).
Existentialism is one of the central philosophical schools  or attitudes  of the 
modern time that stress the individual above all. Some aspects  of Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy greatly influenced such philosophers  as Kierkegaard, 
Sartre, and Heidegger. Their philosophies emphasize the importance of the 
authentic individual and man’s existence in the uncertain and modernly 
unattainable world. Existentialism is therefore deeply fond of the idea of authentic 
existence. Existentialism denies  the practical supremacy of reason and the 
universality of moral values  (Grene 1952: 266). Existentialism is  therefore a 
nominalist philosophy descriptive of the crisis14  of its  time (Grene 1952: 273; 
Rochberg-Halton 1986: x; Taborsky 1998: 15-19).
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12  In Brief über den Humanismus (1946), but also in his works  after that, Heidegger rejects 
existentialism, humanism, and the naturalist and scientific conception of  man (Philipse 1998: 199).
13  In fact, Heidegger’s anti-intellectualism has been identified by Richard Rorty, himself an anti-
intellectualist neo-pragmatist, with the kind of pragmatism John Dewey advocated. William 
Blattner (2000) provides an account of  this.
14 With crisis, Grene (1952) is most likely referring to the Holocaust.
Heidegger and Sartre have very different ideas of what it is  that drives the 
individual toward authenticity. Marjorie Grene (1952) provides an account of 
these differences. According to Grene, Heidegger sees death to be the ultimate 
fear one has  to face in order to reach genuine existence. Death is the only 
experience not interchangeable with those of other individuals. It is  therefore the 
death of the individual, not that of everyone, that the individual comes to meet. 
Death therefore becomes  the one thing that is  really the reason to uphold an idea 
of freedom, the one thing that remains  pure, and ultimately the authentic 
experience, the ultimate reason and bringer of meaning (Johnson 2000: 27-28). 
Theodor Adorno (1986: 133) puts is  well in The jargon of authenticity when he writes 
that ‘[v]iolence inheres in the nucleus of  Heidegger’s philosophy’.15
For Sartre, however, existence is not that much about the death of the individual 
since it is one experience that does not become part of the individual’s  experiences 
but has more significance to others16. Sartre’s  existentialism is  about freedom and 
the individual’s ability to confront the nature of his or her freedom. Sartre 
therefore places more emphasis on life than he does  on death. (Grene 1952: 
268-269.)
Both Sartre and Heidegger’s  philosophies  still deal with notions of freedom and 
loneliness. Existentialists  see the individual as ‘thrown into the world’ and always 
responsible for his or her actions and destinies. The authentic individual has 
courage to deal with his or her freedom to make choices, something the 
inauthentic individual is  afraid to do. Sartre and Heidegger’s  existentialisms are 
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15 A more detailed description of  death and Dasein is provided by Peter Gordon (2010: 174): 
‘One's own death is a future possibility of complete individuation that every person must experience only for him- or 
herself. But because it puts an end to the Dasein that is in each case “mine,” death itself cannot be an object of 
phenomenological reflection. The possibility for understanding oneself as a whole can therefore emerge only from the 
anticipation of death, the future-directed or “not-yet” structure Heidegger called Being-toward-death. Heidegger 
therefore insisted that his phenomenological treatment of death and anxiety should not be mistaken for morbid 
fascination, nor for an anthropological commentary on the centrality of death for human experience. Rather, the 
anticipatory anxiety for Being-toward-death lights up the temporal primacy of the future within Dasein's ontological 
structure.’
16  For more on metaphysics of death and the identity of the dead body see for example Carter 
1984 and Rosenberg 1984.
therefore attempts  to understand the nature of man’s loneliness in the world as the 
ultimate locus of authentic experience and authentic individuality. (Grene 1952; 
Johnson 2000.)
Cornelius Holtorf (2005: 144-145), even though not an existentialist, states that 
the kind of archaeology that has  been inspired by modern philosophy has been 
characterized by an obsession of maintaining and valuing seemingly objective and 
unchanging monumental sites like Stonehenge. It is therefore contradictory that in 
the ethos of the very same modern archaeology it is totally accepted and expected 
to destroy a site and replace it with seemingly unchanging and objective scientific 
documentation.
An interesting point and an implication of a Heideggerian existential philosophy 
in archaeology then is  the way heritage sites and artifacts  can be seen as existential 
signs. The authenticity of an artifact or site can very well be seen to stem from the 
notion that death or destruction renders an object authentic. Archaeologists  have a 
lot of power since excavation is  always  destructive. The site’s  life is  brought to an 
end and its authenticity is  in a way fixed and proclaimed when archaeologists 
destroy them. 
Heritage sites  are valued and protected before and after excavations but they only 
become significant to modern scientific archaeology after they have been 
‘destroyed’. After their destruction very little can be said about the actual site but 
future archaeologists have to rely only on documentation and gathered artifacts. It 
is  no wonder Christopher Tilley (1989) compares  excavation to theatre (more on 
this in chapter III).
Individualism
After the brief introduction to existentialism, let me now explain in more detail 
some of the key concerns modernity has raised regarding authenticity and the 
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individual. The objects of this concern are sometimes referred to as  the malaises 
of  modernity (Taylor 1992).
Since modern times, there has always been a need for authenticity. Richard 
Handler (1986: 2) writes that authenticity is  (1) a cultural construct of the Western 
world, it is  (2) closely tied to notions of individuality, and (3) the tendency to unite 
authenticity and individuality sits tight in both common sense and anthropological 
theories  about other cultures. Handler sees authenticity in anthropology to be 
closely tied to the notion of  individuality.
Anthropology’s  dependence on the idea of an authentic individual has lead, and 
will lead, to a distorted image of other cultures. It is, of course, impossible to free 
oneself from any subjective interpretations but the realization of the fixation on 
the individual could possibly lead to a less biased understanding of the past and 
past people’s reasoning.
The objective of all authentic individuals  is to be true to oneself. This  moral 
understanding of the connection between individuality and authenticity was put 
forward by Lionel Trilling in Sincerity and authenticity (1972). After his formulation 
authenticity began to be seen as  equivalent to self-fulfillment and being true to 
oneself; sincerity, as the title of  his book implies. 
Charles  Taylor (1992: 15) uses the word authenticity in the same sense Trilling 
does. His approach is  also ethical as  the title of his book The ethics of authenticity 
implies. Taylor’s  study is about the modern condition of the society and the 
malign ideas  modernity has brought along; the concepts  that, in his view, define 
modernity.
Some people think individuality is  one of the great advancements modernity 
brought with it. Taylor, however, sees  it as a source for worry. According to Taylor, 
individuality is one of the ‘malaises of modernity’. Individuality is  the human 
being’s ability to choose his or her own path and destiny. The individual is not 
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bound to the ties  of tradition or history. Past (premodern) people belonged to a 
great chain of being that gave the sense of meaning to their lives. The modern 
man, however, as  he is  detached from the larger social unity, has to look for 
meaning elsewhere. Taylor sees  concentration on the individual to flatten and 
narrow life, make it poorer in meaning. It also makes  it harder to take others  and 
the society into account. (Taylor 1992: 2-4.)
Taylor’s second source of worry is  the supremacy of instrumental reason in the 
modern society. He sees  this  to lead to the overemphasized importance of 
technology and reliance on machines  when answers  ought to be looked for 
elsewhere. This attitude has  lead to the identification of the human body with 
machines. The human body is  treated as a machine instead of acknowledging it as 
an entity that operates  on the level of whole. One that has a life history. (Taylor 
1992: 5-7)
An interesting point concerning human being in the modern world of material 
mass production and mechanical reproduction is  made by philosopher Hannah 
Arendt. According to Arendt (1958: 95-96), ‘the reality and reliability of the 
human world rest primarily on the fact that we are surrounded by things  more 
permanent than the activity by which they were produced, and potentially even 
more permanent than the lives of their authors’. Taylor (1992: 7) sees this 
permanence to be compromised in the modern world.
Taylor’s third malaise of the modern, then, is that the modern technology-based 
society paradoxically limits  the individual’s  ability to make choices. The modern 
world limits our freedom but also affects us. The choices we make in the 
instrumental world seize to be our own and are more dictated by the society and 
the bureaucratic system we live in. For example, individuals’ choices are limited in 
certain cities where it is  almost impossible for a public transportation to function 
since the cities are designed for private transportation. (Taylor 1992: 8-9.)
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The above-mentioned three malaises  of the modern have primarily lead to the 
loss  of meanings  in the society, an attribute that matters most when it comes  to 
experiencing the past and the authenticity of  archaeological artifacts.
Even though much of the twentieth century archeology has been dominated by 
perspectives  which emphasize the role of the social whole, the more recent 
reaction against this  view (postprocessualism, also known as  archaeology of the 
individual) has resulted in the identification of an independent and autonomous 
individual Modern archaeology is  immersed in the individualistic thinking and 
finds  itself in trouble when making interpretations  regarding the past. (Thomas 
2004a: 119-148, 2004b: 27.)
Jargon of  authenticity
One of the most well known criticizers of the existential philosophy is Theodor 
Adorno. Adorno was  a member of the Frankfurt school of critical theory. His 
approach is  Hegelian-Marxist as  opposed to what Adorno himself calls 
Heidegger’s Platonic idealism (Adorno 1986: xiii, xvii, 140).
Since no objective validation for the disappearance of the modern industrial 
domination exist, members of the Frankfurt school uphold the ideal of critical 
reason, which they say lacked from the existential theoreticians’ philosophy. 
Critical reason therefore includes  the possibility of the contingent nature of the 
limitations nature and history set. (Adorno 1986: x.) Adorno (1986: 137-138) 
criticizes Heidegger’s idealism as  something that sets the real world as  secondary 
to mortality which is  the only tangible for Heidegger. This kind of thinking evades 
all real problems in the world and, in the end, leads to nihilism. This  is  obviously 
what upsets Adorno.
Adorno argues that the terminology of existentialism has become a jargon that 
aims to portray the magic of existentialism, something Walter Benjamin (2008) 
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called aura. To call it jargon is to express  the language’s  inability to express truth. 
That is also one of Adorno’s  (1986: 41-45) worries. Existentialism expressed the 
need for historical meanings  and liberation but this resulted in the mystification of 
the relationship between language and the object world. The jargon compresses 
objective consciousness  into self-experience. This  is what lead to idealism in 
existentialism. (Adorno 1986: xiii.)
In The jargon of authenticity Adorno (1986) set out to salvage what is left of the 
concept of subject after the existentialists’ treatment of it. In the existentialist 
philosophy the authentic individual is  ultimately identified with and reduced to the 
level of an idea. For Heidegger it was death, and for Sartre freedom. Adorno 
hopes to return the individual its subjectivity in the irreducible form. For Adorno, 
the subject is, however, also mystification of domination. Critical theory for him 
therefore becomes a moment of  class struggle. (Adorno 1986: ix.)17
Adorno, then, addresses the questions  loss  of meaning in the modern society has 
raised. Adorno (1986: 35-36) writes that:
Socially the feeling of meaninglessness  is a reaction to the wide-
reaching freeing from work which takes  place under conditions  of 
continuing social unfreedom. The free time of the subjects withholds 
from them the freedom which they secretly hope for; their free time 
chains them to the ever-same, the apparatus of production - even 
when this apparatus is giving them a vacation.
And he continues:
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17  An interesting point about Adorno’s  dissatisfaction is the way in which he criticizes what 
Kierkegaard wrote about agape as a form of love that transcends all class boundaries.  According to 
Adorno (1986:  x-xii), Kierkegaard’s  radical Christian inwardness evades the actuality of secular 
injustice and inequality in society. (See also Marila 2010.)
The search for meaning as  that which something is  authentically [...] 
pushes away [...] the question as  to the right of this something. 
(Adorno 1986: 41.)
Adorno criticizes the goal existentialists  set. What man already is becomes his 
goal. Adorno hopes for the disappearance of meaninglessness along with the 
disappearance of  this kind on nonsense. (Adorno 1986: 37-38.)
An interesting question, then, is what kind of jargon of authenticity is used when 
discussing the relationship between scientific archaeology and popular 
archaeology. There seems to exist a particular jargon of authenticity in 
archaeology. On the one hand, archaeologists with strong faith in historical 
authenticity emphasize the meaning of restoration and conservation. For them, 
material cultural heritage is irreplaceable. Their jargon of authenticity rests  on the 
same themes  and notions as an existential philosophy does; uniqueness, 
authenticity, personhood, identity, original, etc. On the other hand, one can 
identify archaeologists like Cornelius  Holtorf, whose view of the past is  based on 
maxims  of popular archaeology. The jargon of authenticity in contemporary 
popular archaeology (postprocessualism) often includes  notions like the past as  a 
renewable resource, multivocality (i.e. relativism), metaphor, individuality18. Even 
though the former believe in a real past more often than the latter, there seems  to 
exist one common theme in both discourses - the idea of  individuality.
Bettina Arnold (2008) has proposed that a certain kind of jargon has been in use 
when the past has been used to legitimize political objectives. According to 
Arnold, professional archaeology rests on such vocabulary that easily obscures, 
rather than clarifies meaning. The study of prehistory is  often vulnerable to such 
manipulation. It depends on minimum of data and maximum of interpretation. 
(Arnold 2008: 141.)
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18  An interesting point is provided by David Lowenthal (2008: 7).  He sees the notion of 
authenticity in the age of cultural relativity to be a contradiction in terms. In this sense the notion 
of  authenticity in postprocessual archaeology is very much part of  a jargon.
Summary
In this  chapter, I have discussed modernity and some of the implications of 
modern philosophy in archaeology. Modernity brought with it a sense of 
discontinuity and detachment from tradition, and other forms or sources  of 
meaning had to be constructed. Among these are the existentialist notion of an 
authentic individual, a notion promoted by Heidegger in his  early existentialist 
philosophy. Individuality has also been termed one of the malaises of modernity 
by Charles Taylor.
Also distinctive of modernity is  the binary thinking that has its roots  in the 
enlightenment philosophy of Descartes. Some of the most important binaries in 
archaeology and anthropology are the authentic versus  inauthentic, social versus 
individual, and theory versus data. 
Recently, however, another kind of ontology has emerged in archaeology. One 
that acknowledges the material as  essentially inseparable from the immaterial. 
This  so-called symmetrical archaeology is reluctant to make a distinction between 
mind and matter.
Another distinctively modern phenomenon is the tendency toward systematic 
thinking. This legacy can be seen to have characterized scientific archaeology 
throughout its  history, from culture history to processualism and 
postprocessualism, which all rely on a notion of system or a systematic approach 
to studying the past.19
After this  chapter on modern philosophy and the significance of modern thinking 
in archaeology, I will turn to presenting another philosophical outlook. One that 
has affected modern archaeology at least as  much as modernity, namely 
postmodernism.
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19 Leo Klejn (1973: 695-696) has pointed that type,  style, and archaeological culture in culture historical 
archaeology can be seen as early moves toward systems thinking in archaeology.
Authenticity and postmodernism
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I presented modernity as the philosophical grounds for 
modern archaeology and the notion of authenticity. There is undoubtedly much 
of the traits of modern thinking in the way authenticity has been conceived in 
archaeology. During the last 30 years or so, archaeology and the question of 
authenticity have been more affected by postmodernism.20  If modernity is a 
concept hard to outline, postmodernism is  perhaps even harder. Matthew Johnson 
(1999: 162) calls it a ‘red herring’, which is probably what has happened to it. 
Postmodernism may not be very fashionable in current archaeology, but it has 
nevertheless  had a profound influence in, or developed in the same social 
atmosphere with, postprocessual archaeology (Johnson 1999: 166). There is  a clear 
connection to be seen between postmodernism and postprocessual archaeology.
Whereas there seems to exist a somewhat unified consensus  of accepting 
modernity as  a philosophical outlook and a social condition, some postmodern 
authors (most famously Michel Foucault) have rejected the postmodernist label 
that has been put on them, and postmodernism as a discourse or an era has been 
rejected in general. There exists no consensus of  postmodernism.
While some authors  remain skeptic, I acknowledge postmodernism as a set of 
certain isms and a continuity of certain modern philosophical traditions, namely 
relativism, nominalism, structuralism, and poststructuralism. The postmodern 
‘era’, if one can speak of such, must also be seen as an important background for 
postprocessual archaeology, which adopted many instruments from 
poststructuralism in particular. There is therefore no question that postmodernism 
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20 I call postmodernism an ism because it is more an attitude and a way of seeing things than it is a 
wide-reaching and long-lasting era or a social condition.
could not be seen as  a certain philosophical outlook that has  affected archaeology 
greatly, just like modernity has.
In this chapter, I will provide a brief introduction to postmodernism. I will also 
discuss  some aspects of postmodernism which can be seen as  the malaises  of the 
postmodern, namely the poststructuralist text metaphor in material culture 
studies. Postmodernism can also be seen as a crisis of authenticity with its  notions 
of  constructivism and simulation.
What is postmodernism
Probably the most well known definition of postmodernism has been given by 
Jean-François Lyotard (1984: xxiv): postmodernism, for him, is  ‘incredulity toward 
meta-narratives’. Meta-narrative, or grand narrative, for Lyotard includes  the idea 
of one historical narrative, the all-explaining nature of natural sciences, and free 
will or any kind of progress  of humankind, all beliefs  characteristic of the 
Enlightenment of the eighteenth century (Johnson 1999: 162-163). According to 
Lyotard, postmodernism is  not a new age but a rewriting of certain themes 
modernity pretended to have gained, the general emancipation of humankind in 
particular (Readings 1991: 53).
Postmodernity is therefore seen as  the coming of age of humanity (Bauman 1996: 
17). Robert Eaglestone (2001: 7 in Thomas 2004a: 50), among others, has 
proposed that the Holocaust was  what ended modernity. The Holocaust was a 
disaster on such a grand scale that it awoke humanity to realize what the 
objectives  modernity pursues (e.g. utopia, recall previous chapter on modernity) 
can produce. This brought modernity to a new era of  postmodernism.
Zygmunt Bauman (1996) gives some examples of what postmodernism is  in 
Postmodernin lumo (The enchantment of postmodern), a collection of his  papers. 
According to Bauman, postmodernism is  a state of mind of which a certain kind 
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of ‘destructivism’ is  characteristic. Postmodernism aims to deconstruct and 
ridicule. It is a critical attitude, but in its criticism lies a paradox. Postmodernism 
has destroyed everything it is  critical of. Therefore there is  nothing to stand against 
to, and this has lead to the disappearance of  critique. (Bauman 1996: 22.)
Bauman (1996: 21) also states  that postmodernism is freedom to do whatever we 
want.21  This, and the incredulity toward meta-narratives, can be seen to have 
influenced postprocessual archaeology which has, in general, abandoned the 
possibility of finding out certainties about the one objective past. Postprocessualists 
have also started to stress  the role of archaeology in popular culture. Since there 
exists no real past, everyone can know their own past. The postmodern invention 
of ‘little narratives’ (Readings 1991: 64) has reduced narrativity to the level of 
individuality instead of collectivity. This is most evident in recent postprocessual 
archaeology which has  been called the archaeology of the individual (e.g. Johnson 
1999: 104-105).
At the heart of postmodernism is  the idea that meaning can only be seen as 
referentiality in one horizontal semiological system of references (remember the 
discussion of diachronism and synchronism in the prologue). Therefore all 
meaning is  non-historical and all things are authentic as  they only acquire 
meaning in relation to other things  in the same synchronic system. This  has  lead 
to questions  of simulation and hyperreal, also relevant questions  when it comes  to 
knowing and experiencing the past (see chapter III). To these themes I turn next.
Simulation and the hyperreal
Jean Baudrillard (1988: 166-184) has stated that the postmodern culture is 
dominated by simulation. Objects  have no firm origin, no referent, no ground or 
foundation (Baudrillard 1988: 1). This aspect of postmodernism is  a very modern 
phenomenon (remember the discussion of loss of meaning in the previous chapter 
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21 A good example of  this is the so-called ‘Sokal Affair’ (Sokal 2008).
on modernity). Postmodernism continues the modern condition in its  search for 
the mechanisms, or structure, behind meaning-making practices. 
Following the ethos of poststructuralism, and postmodernism in general, 
Baudrillard rejects traditional assumptions (historicity, I assume) about 
referentiality. According to him, the link between a concept and an object ‘is 
broken and restructured so that its  force is directed, not to the referent of use 
value or utility, but to desire22’. He argues that the meaning of things  can only be 
reached by using a semiological model (more on semiology and semiotics further 
in this chapter, and in chapter IV). (Baudrillard 1988: 1-2.)
Baudrillard follows Lyotard’s famous  statement and rejects the possibility of a 
meta-narrative. He even goes as  far as suggesting that the contemporary modern 
society is  returning to a premodern organization (Vanhanen 2010: 130). This is 
due to human nature in which, according to Baudrillard, is to value modes of 
production which do not contribute to a utilitarian system of consumption and 
accumulation of wealth (Vanhanen 2010: 130), but to the organization of all this 
(Baudrillard 1988: 21-22). All objects  of consumption are signs  that are consumed 
for their difference, not their materiality. Only the idea is consumed. (Baudrillard 
1988: 22, 24-25.)
An important aspect of Baudrillard’s philosophy, and all postmodernism, is  the 
role of the individual in the consumption society. Baudrillard (1988: 52) states  that, 
as  a consumer, the individual has  become necessary and even irreplaceable. 
Consumption, for Baudrillard (1988: 52-53), then, is social labour; an element of 
control by atomizing or necessitating individual consumers.
For Baudrillard, the end of modern consumption and modernity marks the 
beginning of the age of simulacra, characterized by a unique mode of 
‘simulation’. What was once real, labour, production and use-value, has  been 
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22 Is this why Shanks  (e.g. Shanks 1992,  1995, 1998) keeps referring to the process of making the 
past through desire? More on this in chapter III.
abolished. Objects  have become signs that refer to other signs in an infinite 
recession. Reality has  become to emulate its  simulations, as  if everything has 
shifted to a meta-level of articulation, essentially putting an end to the distinction 
between real and simulation (Vanhanen 2010: 131.) Simulation, for Baudrillard, 
however, is  more real than reality, it is hyperreal (Baudrillard 1987: 67; Vanhanen 
2010: 131). 
By postmodernism, we have arrived at the hyperreal state of affairs. 
Postmodernism is characterized by the end of production (but not consumption), 
the end of ideologies (a modern trait), and the end of critique. (Vanhanen 2010: 
131-132.) For Baudrillard, Las Vegas and the Disneyland are what epitomize 
simulation. They are not artificial copies  of the original since artificiality no longer 
exists. One can go to Luxor to see the Pyramids, or go to Las Vegas  and do the 
same. There is  no longer an essential distinction between the two. (Baudrillard 
1988: 171-172; Vanhanen 2010: 132.)
The past in postprocessual archaeology has  become an object of consumption and 
can be experienced as even more real than the real past which does  not exist in the 
first place. The past, since it is simulation in the simulated present, can be reached 
and experienced in theme parks  (Holtorf 2005, 2007, 2010a; Shepherd 2002: 185. 
See also chapter III in this thesis, especially Holtorf  on time travel).
‘It is  no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of 
concealing the fact that the real is no longer real’. Disneyland is  presented as 
imaginary so that that which remains outside can be made look real, when in fact 
what remains  outside is hyperreal and simulation (Baudrillard 1988: 172), just as 
Disneyland itself.
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Poststructuralism and the text metaphor
Poststructuralism is  often seen as a postmodern outlook in literature studies. 
Whereas postmodernism strives to deconstruct, poststructuralism, however, aims 
to uphold an idea of a structure. Poststructuralism is therefore more a semiotic 
discourse based on the structuralist semiotics, or semiology, of Ferdinand de 
Saussure (1990). One example of a structuralist approach in archaeology is 
systems thinking; another is the tendency to assign agency to things  and humans, 
as  proposed by Anthony Giddens  (e.g. 1987) and his successors. These are not 
postmodern approaches  per se. In fact, examples  of systems  thinking can be seen 
throughout the history of archaeology. Structure therefore is not a postmodern 
notion but, in archaeology, should be seen to stem from Saussurean semiotics. 
There is, however, a distinct difference between structuralism and 
poststructuralism.23
One of the most influential concepts  in poststructuralism is the treatment of 
material culture as text (e.g. Preucel and Mrozowski 2010: 15). This  approach, I 
think, is also one of the malaises of postmodernism and poststructuralism, since it 
alienates us from the material world and reduces  the material to the level of idea. 
The basic tenets of this kind of philosophy are that text can be read in different 
ways and text can mean different things  to different people (Johnson 1999: 105). A 
text, then, can always  be read differently in different contexts, just like in Holtorf ’s 
(2010a: 37) reasoning authenticity can mean different things to different people 
according to the context of  the observer (see chapter IV).24
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23 Paul Ricœur, whose philosophy has been called philosophical anthropology (Ricœur 2000: 7), is 
one of the key figures in poststructuralism as he can be seen as  one of the first philosophers  (or 
anthropologists) to extend the concept of text to the study of material culture (Ricœur 2000: 
27-30).  Preucel and Mrozowski (2010: 15) note that Ian Hodder (e.g. 1986) borrows  his notion of 
material culture as text from Ricœur.
24  Material culture as  text and its implications has been widely discussed in archaeology and one 
may note that it is  not of relevance in current archaeological theory. It is, however, an important 
topic and a background for what I propose further in this thesis, namely in chapter IV.
The wide-ranging poststructuralist notion of material culture as text has been 
immensely influential in archaeology (Hodder 1986: 34), but few have noticed the 
difficulties  it  arises. In order for the material culture assemblages to be studied as 
text, certain syntactical rules have to be found or presumed. The material culture 
has to be assumed to be constructed according to certain sequences  or structures, 
or a syntax. Evidently the notion of material culture being structured by the same 
rules and sequences as linguistic (written or spoken) texts will not hold. 
Ian Hodder (1986, 1989a) has, in true poststructuralist spirit, pointed out that 
material culture texts  differ from language. According to Hodder (1989a: 260 in 
Preucel and Bauer 2001: 87) material culture texts are different from written text, 
in three aspects. In written texts, words are always largely arbitrary since they are 
written in specific social contexts. Hodder calls this  the arbitrariness  principle for 
the reason that spoken and written words are always  more or less arbitrary in that 
they are used in relation to the user's  context. The second is  called the linearity 
principle for the reason that written texts  are read in a linear fashion, while there is 
no certain sequence by which to read material surroundings. The third is called 
the sensory principle since written texts  and spoken words are only read using two 
senses, sight and hearing, while reading of material culture texts  involves smell, 
touch and taste as well. (Hodder 1986: 122-123; 1989a.) 
That may very well be one of the reasons none of the semiological (structuralist) 
theories  applied in material culture studies have been successful in explaining 
material culture meanings. The semiological theory of signs may be effective and 
even necessary when studying language (Hénault 2010: 106) or musical and visual 
signs, as has been noticed after some rereading of Saussure (Hénault 2010: 114). 
Hodder (1989a) thereby correctly identifies  differences between material culture as 
text and written texts.
According to Preucel and Bauer (2001: 87), to Hodder and some other 
postprocessualists, it is  the applicability of semiotics where the problem of the text 
metaphor lies. Bauer (2002: 39) and Preucel and Bauer (2001: 87), however, have 
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noticed that it is  not that much the application of semiotics but that of the 
Saussurean semiological view of sign that is ‘outmoded’. They then go on to suggest 
the use of the Peircean model for the semiotic study of material culture. The 
pragmatistic approach, in their view, is especially suitable for the archaeological 
study of  material culture.
Archaeology is interested in the long-term meanings of objects, and that is  one of 
the central differences  between material culture as  text and linguistic texts. 
Written, as well as spoken texts are to a great extent material, and their full 
meaning extends beyond their semantic meanings25. Material objects, however, 
have a different kind of ability to transform or maintain their meanings  over time 
(Preucel 2006: 84; Preucel and Bauer 2001: 87, 94). These are the main reasons 
why the semiological (Saussurean) theory of signs  is  not as suitable as the 
pragmatistic approach for material culture studies. Peirce's  theory of knowledge as 
historical should turn out to be particularly well suited for the semiotic study of 
material culture meanings and authenticity. To this I turn in chapter IV.
Summary
In this chapter, I have discussed postmodernity and its influence in postprocessual 
archaeology. I started by giving some definitions of what postmodernity is. After 
that I presented the concepts of hyperreal and simulation and discussed their role 
in postprocessual archaeology. Then I argued the problems  of the once influential 
text metaphor in archaeology and the study of material culture. It is  my view that 
the text metaphor can be seen as  a malaise of the postmodern. It detaches  the 
human from the material, a symptom that is  frequent in postprocessual 
archaeology.
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25 With this  statement,  I refer to the material traits  of language, such as  the material form in which 
text is produced on paper, but also to the material aspects of voice, and the more pragmatic aspects 
of  language, such as metaphors which are often based on material attributes.
In the next chapter, the core of this thesis, I will discuss  more explicitly the 
question of authenticity in archaeology. In the next chapter, there is, however, 
constant resonating to be seen with what I have already written here. After all, 
postprocessual archaeology has, in my view, been mostly influenced by 
postmodernism, philosophy, literary studies, linguistics, and semiotics. This very 
brief chapter on postmodernism therefore also serves as an introduction to the 
next chapter.
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III
AUTHENTICITY IN ARCHAEOLOGY
Introduction
In archaeology, authenticity has often been taken for granted. Still, it has  been a 
subject of discussion ever since the 1980s  when archaeologists  became interested 
in alternative ways  of experiencing the past. In the contemporary postprocessual, 
postmodern, popular archaeology only scientific archaeologists, who are more 
often than not preoccupied, and even obsessed, with measuring the past as 
accurately as  possible, share a common crave for the authentic archaeology. Troy 
Lovata (2007: 21) points out, very astutely, that ‘not everyone even wants authentic 
archaeologies  - whether scientific or not - and understand what this  fact means  for 
professionals who work in the public sphere’.
In this chapter, I will discuss the notion of authenticity in archaeology. I will 
mostly be discussing the treatment of the concept in postmodern postprocessual 
archaeology, but I will also present a genealogy of the postprocessual archaeology, 
starting from culture historical archaeology and processual archaeology.
An important notion to be kept in mind when reading this  chapter is  the 
distinction between postprocessual archaeology as popular ‘anything goes’ 
archaeology (Oestigaard 2004: 35) and postprocessual archaeology as  scientific 
archaeology. While postprocessualists  often emphasize the significance of 
alternative approaches  to knowing the past, they welcome them as  something to 
be taken seriously (Johnson 1999: 166-167). That is one of the postmodern traits 
of postprocessual archaeology; the disappearance of the limits  between disciplines, 
and the disappearance of faith in knowing the one truth (Johnson 1999: 166), a 
meta-narrative, has lead the archaeologists to accept all understandings of the past 
as  equally valid. Only in some extreme cases does this  manifest in total relativism. 
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Even though, in this chapter, I approach the topic with an open mind, I maintain 
that archaeologists (yes, scientific archaeologists) still have the advantage in 
knowing the past most accurately (e.g. Dane and Pratt 2007). Not all forms of 
acquiring knowledge are equal (Preucel and Mrozowski 2010: 4).
Experiencing the past - tourism, theatre, and time travel
What Kristian Kristiansen (2008) was  concerned about, has  very much happened 
to archaeology and the cultural heritage (see for example Rowan and Baram 
2004). It has  been subjected to the open market forces  - popular culture that is  - 
and rendered a product. To know the past today is  about experiencing and 
consuming the past in the present (Holtorf 2005: 127; Ikäheimo 2010: 19). That is 
why it is important to provide the reader with some insight to what it means for 
archaeologists to be dealing with a product of  consumption.
I argue that people are experiencing the past in a way similar to that of a tourist’s 
experience of unfamiliar and exotic settings (Stronza 2001: 261; Shanks 1992: 58). 
There is  always something very existential about the encounter between a tourist 
and an unknown and unordinary location. The same, then, can be applied to 
experiencing the past (Holtorf and Schadla-Hall 1999: 236; Lowenthal 1985). In a 
way the tourist is always confronted with a set of existential and transcendental 
signs, be they signs of a long lost culture or civilization, or a living culture very 
different from that of the tourist’s own background. Therefore theories of tourism 
and the tourist may prove very valuable and applicable when it comes to defining 
what kind of experiences people are looking for and what parts of their heritage 
they find valuable and meaningful.
Tourism, as well as authenticity, is  widely acknowledged as a modern 
phenomenon (Culler 1990; Enzensberger 1996; Gemünden 1996; MacCannell 
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198926), and theoretical discussion of the tourist and tourism probably started as 
early as in the 1950s. Even though the beginning of tourism can be dated back to 
ancient Greece and the beginning of the modern era (Adler 1989 in Chi 1997: 
63), it was  not until well after colonialist times  and the WWII in the twentieth 
century that saw the beginning of mass tourism, which in turn sparked the 
theoretical considerations of  tourism.
Hans  Enzensberger’s (1996) A theory of tourism, first published in 1958, is probably 
one of the first attempts  to theorize tourism as a modern phenomenon. In his 
article Enzensberger sees modern tourism still being motivated by romantic ideas 
of untouched (authentic) worlds. This ‘quest for authenticity’ (Baudrillard 2005: 
81) then paradoxically falls  in on itself since it becomes  harnessed by the very 
same society that in all of its  incoherency produced the need for authenticity in 
the first place. (Gemünden 1996: 113.)
If the modern world is incoherent and unorganized and therefore continually in 
search for authenticity and a kind of fulfillment, is it not because of the chaotic 
nature of the modern society that an idea of a stable, coherent and unified society 
is held? Is  it somewhat an illusion that such an authentic past in the form of the 
rural and peasant society would ever have existed, and, furthermore, if 
authenticity is indeed an illusion, how come we usually accept that illusion with 
such happiness, joy, and content?
Dean MacCannell (1989) formulates  his theory of modern tourism and 
approaches  the question of authenticity in The Tourist. He uses  the concept of 
staged authenticity to explain the tourist experience; people know what they are 
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26 Although in the introduction to the 1989 edition, the introductory chapter of his 1989 reprint of 
The Tourist, MacCannell admits that the tourist and tourism is also a postmodern phenomenon, 
and all that has  been written in the first edition still applies  and is valid today. The Tourist was first 
published in 1976, and at that time postmodernism was not a well established concept.  The end of 
modernity,  and in a way the advent of postmodernism [although Zygmunt Bauman (1996: 17) 
does  not see the transition from modernity to postmodernity to be a form of liberation, but rather 
the modern becoming self-aware], is often thought to have happened right after the Holocaust 
(Eaglestone 2001: 7 in Thomas 2004a: 50).  If the beginnings of modern tourism are said to date to 
the postwar period after the WWII, then it is a truly postmodern phenomenon.
experiencing is not real and authentic but feel content with it anyway. According 
to MacCannell (2008: 334) staged authenticity is  authenticity’s negation, an 
attempt to move beyond the front-back binary made famous by Erving Goffman 
(1959), very much similar to what Edward Bruner (2005: 5), also hoping to 
transcend such binaries as real versus show, authentic versus  inauthentic and front 
versus back, wrote in Culture on tour.27
To Goffman (1959), all social action is play, and he uses  theater as an analogy 
when he explains  how people will alter their social roles  according to their position 
(front or back) on the stage. The idea of people necessarily withholding some 
aspects  of their personality will ultimately lead to a position where the tourist is 
always  confronted with a staged play, never allowed backstage to experience 
authenticity.
The theatre analogy has also been used in archaeology. In Excavation as theatre, 
Christopher Tilley (1989) proposes  that too much emphasis has  been placed upon 
the acquirement of archaeological material in excavations. There is, more 
importantly, a need for reporting the findings in a fashion that is  more accessible to 
the wider audience. The reason archaeologists are only able to produce a very 
one-dimensional picture of the past is  due to the fact that the past is being 
produced material through excavations. According to Tilley (1989: 278) ‘[t]he 
excavation is only partly to do with the effective (obtaining information) but owes 
much more to the affective - socially mediated responses to the traces of the past’. 
In a way archaeologists  decide what interpretation of the past is presented to the 
public, i.e. how the past should be experienced. Because the interpretation of the 
material mostly happens  after the excavations, archaeologists  should be more 
concerned with interpretation in relation to an audience for whom both 
excavations and site reports  are produced matter (Tilley 1989: 278-280). 
Excavations are therefore a form of theater in which neither the archaeologists 
nor the audience have much power over the produced perception of  the past.
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27 Bruner (2005: 5) rejects such postmodern concepts as simulacra. According to him, there is  no 
simulacra in tourism because there is no original.
In Theatre/Archaeology Mike Pearson and Michael Shanks  (2001) provide an 
extensive study of the theatre analogy in archaeology. Experiencing the past is  also 
about a performative model of the construction of archaeological knowledge; the 
past is  not discovered (even though that is  one potent metaphor) but produced in a 
process of  ‘recontextualisation’ (Pearson and Shanks 2001: 10-11).
In his  recent article, Holtorf (2010a) discusses  the possibility of time travel and its 
significance to experiencing the past. Holtorf proposes that the possibility of time 
travel is  solely dependent on the definition of the present, the past, and the future. 
He acknowledges the absurdity of traveling back and forth along the linear 
timeline, but he does not see time travel to be only a metaphor or simply 
imaginative. In his  definition, the past and the future are not physical realities to 
which one can travel. The present, however, is a reality definable as the sum of all 
human experiences and social practices. Therefore reality is  virtual and all time 
travel possible. (Holtorf  2010a).
Time travel is  not only an important factor in experiencing pastness (and 
futureness), but also crucial to the way people relate to the past in general (Holtorf 
2010a: 37). Because the past is readily available to all people, it should also be of 
interest to the professionals  to value heritage and past material culture because of 
their potential to evoke the feeling of pastness (Holtorf 2010a: 37), not only for 
their scientific value or historical authenticity.
Time travel, theatre, and tourism are of great relevance to experiencing the past. 
They are very well worthy of study when addressing the question of authenticity 
in archaeology. Staged authenticity, front and back, and theatre are valid analogies 
when it comes to experiencing the authenticity of heritage sites and artifacts, since 
they issue the question of how accurately and authentically the past can in fact be 
reached.
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After this  chapter on experiencing the past, I will turn to introducing a more 
explicit example of experiencing the pastness of things, namely aura, and address 
the question of the reproducible nature of the past and what questions that can 
raise in archaeology.
Reproducing the past - pastness and aura
Since modern times, there has always been a need for authenticity. Richard 
Handler (1986: 2) writes  that authenticity is a social construct of the modern 
Western world, mainly a product of the individualist attitude and the essentialist 
ontology. There is  a need for real and genuine (Handler 1986: 2). In order for 
something to be or become genuine it first needs to be reproduced. What is it, 
then, that distinguishes the original from a reproduction (also recall my dealing of 
this question in the chapter on postmodernism)?
Walter Benjamin (2008) addressed this  question in his essay The work of art in the age 
of its technical reproducibility. According to Benjamin, what distinguishes an authentic 
artifact from a reproduction is  its aura, a certain authoritative element that is 
obtained by identifying with a unique place and time. What is  compromised or 
eliminated in reproducing authentic objects  is  aura. Reproduction detaches the 
reproduced object from the domain of tradition. For Benjamin, aura is  the 
perceived history of an object. (Benjamin 2008: 22-24.) The ability to 
instantaneously reproduce an object denies  the reproduction a historicity, an issue 
also of relevance when, for example, defining whether, and in which cases, the 
contemporary built environment is worth protecting.
For Benjamin, mechanical reproduction is  benign and inevitable. It, for example, 
underlines  the question of assessing the artistic value of painting in contrast to 
photography - whether photography is  art or not (Benjamin 2008: 28-29). 
Benjamin (2008: 35) compares painters  and cameramen (photography and film) to 
magicians and surgeons. The magician heals  a person with his  or her touch, 
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whereas  the surgeon penetrates the human body and uses invasive methods to heal 
his or her patient (Benjamin 2008: 35). This  suggests a somewhat unnatural 
disposition for the cameramen. The painter on the other hand is  much more 
authentic and sincere in his or her reproduction of reality. The painter maintains 
a distance to nature (reality), while the cinematographer penetrates  it (Benjamin 
2008: 35). The cameraman’s method, surprisingly, will provide a more accurate 
account of  reality:
The images  obtained by each differ enormously. The painter’s  is  a 
total image, whereas  that of the cinematographer is  piecemeal, its 
manifold parts being assembled according to a new law. Hence, the 
presentation of reality in film is incomparably the more significant for 
people of today, since it provides the equipment-free aspect of reality 
they are entitled to demand from a work of art, and does so on the 
basis  of the most intensive interpenetration of reality with equipment. 
(Benjamin 2008: 35.)
When it comes to photography, Benjamin’s  essay may be a bit outdated. The same 
analogy could, however, be used in archaeology when comparing the realist and 
constructivist positions. Cornelius Holtorf ’s  (the constructionist surgeon) idea of 
the past and cultural heritage as renewable and dynamic differs from that of 
Kristian Kristiansen (the realist magician), who maintains that the material past is 
finite and needs  to be protected (against surgeons). It is  therefore ironic that 
surgeons  like Holtorf are able to deliver a more detailed and less  detached image 
of the reality of the past, since that picture is less dependent on mechanical 
equipment and allows for a wider variety of  interpretations of  the past.
The interesting question concerning the possibility of an authentic past, now, is 
whether archaeological material is  renewable or not. The reproducible nature of 
cultural heritage would undoubtedly lead to a number of questions concerning 
the authenticity of this material. Holtorf and Schadla-Hall (1999: 299) write that 
the past is partly and potentially renewable, whereas  Holtorf (Holtorf 2005: 132; 
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Holtorf and Piccini 2009: 14) later writes that the past is  a truly renewable 
resource, and, moreover, the past only exists  in the present. If the past is  a 
renewable resource, everything is in a way necessarily authentic, since there is no 
way to make inauthentic copies  of authentic artifacts  for example. When an 
artifact is copied or reproduced, one is left with an authentic copy28.
With his statements  regarding the authentic experience of a reproduction 
Cornelius Holtorf follows Michael Shanks, one of the postprocessualists who has 
written extensively on experiencing the past, and authenticity as  well (Pearson and 
Shanks 2001; Shanks  1992, 1995, 1998). Shanks (1998: 19-20) refers to Walter 
Benjamin (2008). Aura is what creates the feeling of otherness  and distance, no 
matter how close the object having it may be. Both Shanks (1998: 20) and Holtorf 
(2005: 127) maintain that aura is  not something that is  brought to the object but 
something that is made. In their view authenticity is  created through desire, a 
desire for things  that are dead and do not change or go wrong (Holtorf 2005: 121; 
Pearson and Shanks 2001: 114-115; Shanks 1992, 1995: 20, 1998: 19).29
People’s perception of authenticity affect how artifacts  and heritage sites are 
valued. One of Holtorf ’s (2005: 133) points  is  that archaeological material is 
valued because it is protected, not because it is valuable. This material is, of 
course, not valuable because it is  irreplaceable. The reproducible nature of 
archaeological material will not only lead to a situation where the authenticity of 
the past is  compromised whenever reproducing it, but also to a situation where 
much of the past operates  at the level of metaphor. This is  one of the reasons for 
archaeology’s  great power also according to Holtorf (2005, 2007). The past is 
being remade in every present, often through metaphorical means (Holtorf 2005: 
159). These metaphors  can be material (in which cases the understanding of past 
meanings can be based on material of functional similitude, like the functional 
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28  Gilles Deleuze (1968: 355 in Frow 1991: 126-127),  on the other hand, wrote that there is no 
authentic object since the original is already a copy.
29 This is  already one argument against the contextual nature of authenticity and supports  my view 
of authenticity as conventional. The next chapter, Making the past - context and convention,  is  a 
demonstration of  how the past can be produced and rendered authentic based on conventions.
connection between a clay vessel and the human body’s ability to store liquids), or 
more abstract and literal, in which case they deal more with the meanings of 
archaeology rather than the meanings of  past material culture.30
Both Shanks (1992) and Holtorf (2005, 2007) give multiple examples on how the 
act of doing archaeology, and therefore the past, can be experienced in 
metaphorical terms. They include such notions as  detective (clues, puzzle, mystery), 
the law court (rules, logic, reason), adventure (exotic places, danger, romance), tourism 
(escapism), discovery, and excavation (finding, roots, truth, layers, Freud’s 
psychoanalysis as excavation, striptease).
In Theatre/archaeology, Pearson and Shanks (2001: 10) write that experiencing the 
past is about how fragments are left behind and pieced together. This is one reason 
metaphors such as detective work are so potent when it comes to experiencing the 
past.
Is it then perhaps due to the metaphorical nature of archaeology that authenticity 
remains such an ambiguous term? It is hard to see in which respect the past really 
exists and to what extent it is metaphorical and therefore an inseparable part of 
the present. In the next chapter, I will discuss the process of making the past in the 
present through subjecting it to varying contexts and conventions.
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30 For a concise account of material metaphor in archaeology,  see Tilley 1999, and chapter IV in 
this thesis.
Making the past - context and convention
Instead of concentrating on the technical aspects  of the meaning of context in 
archaeological fieldwork and archaeological finds, in this chapter, I will set out to 
explore how contextuality has been approached in postprocessual archaeology 
regarding the context of the individual doing the research, and the researcher’s 
interpretation of the past material culture, and therefore the contextual nature of 
meanings of  material culture.
Ian Hodder (1986, 1987) was among the first ones  to call his archaeology 
contextual.31  The so-called postprocessual archaeology that Hodder, among 
others, endorsed was  born as a critique to the processual archaeology that was 
dominated by objectives and logic and the positivist attitude of the natural 
sciences, influential in archaeology since the 1950s.32 Central to the postprocessual 
archaeology of the 1980s  was the idea that all knowledge of the past is 
constructed in a modern context, and therefore no picture of a real past can be 
reconstructed.
At the heart of postprocessual archaeology was, and still is, hermeneutics. A 
school of understanding two colliding horizons, that of the past context and that 
of the present context. Johnsen and Olsen (1992: 420) propose that Hodder’s 
contextual archaeology operates on these two particular levels; the context where 
the archaeological material was  originally produced, and the context where this 
material is brought into study. Since Hodder thinks archaeology’s  main task is  the 
recovery of past meanings, he has been stressing the critical approach to the 
treatment of archaeological material in order to avoid ‘intellectual 
colonialism’ (Hodder 1986: 106; Johnsen and Olsen 1992: 426).
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31 Johnsen and Olsen (1992) give a detailed description of  this.
32  In fact, archaeology has been driven by positivist notions of science since the birth of modern 
archaeology during the 1800s. With 1950s I refer to the emergence of radio carbon dating which 
tremendously strengthened the importance of natural scientific methods, and physics  in general,  in 
archaeology (e.g. Watson 1992).
This  dichotomizing of context may sound somewhat inconsistent with the 
manifesto of hermeneutics in general, but once one realizes  that Hodder (1986: 
94) draws his idea of reliving the past (by the process  of question and answer) 
from R. G. Collingwood (1946: 218), his approach is  well justified. With the notion 
of trying to understand the past author (the maker of an ancient artifact in this 
case) Hodder follows a certain kind of idealism, just like Collingwood’s philosophy 
of history does. In stressing the importance of critical interpretation, however, 
Hodder’s approach is  in total congruence with the ideals of hermeneutics, even 
though Hodder’s  early contextual archaeology ultimately is  closer to idealism than 
hermeneutics.
I have given the previous as an indication of what context was  originally taken to 
mean in archaeology since the 1980s. Hodder’s (1986, 1987) treatment of the 
notion has greatly influenced archaeology ever since, and it is worth noticing that 
the interpretive archaeology that has its roots in early hermeneutic postprocessual 
archaeology thrives today. A great example of that is  the way authenticity has 
been dealt with since the 1990s. Since other interpretations of the past were 
accepted and considered valid since the 1980s, the past was made more readily 
available to the wider audience, and furthermore, the ways  groups other than 
scientific archaeology dealt with the past were embraced rather than rejected by 
archaeologists. Archaeology has since become a very important theme in popular 
culture for instance.
In archaeology, authenticity’s  ambiguous  nature has  often been explained by 
referring to its contextual nature. The idea of contextual authenticity is  a natural 
continuation of hermeneutics and contextual interpretive archaeology 
(postprocessual archaeology). Cornelius Holtorf, a die-hard postprocessualist and 
constructivist, sees  authenticity in particular to be a highly contextual attribute 
that varies when an artifact or a heritage site is  brought into a different context 
(Holtorf 2005: 117-118; Holtorf and Schadla-Hall 1999: 230). Holtorf and 
Schadla-Hall (1999: 229) write that less emphasis should be placed on the 
importance of the actual age and thus the genuineness of artifacts. Holtorf (2005: 
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115) states, however, (as  I already stated above) that ‘[d]espite the theoretical 
difficulties  in defining it, authenticity is  arguably the single most important 
property of archaeological finds and exhibits’. According to Holtorf and Schadla-
Hall (1999: 229), the public as consumers of the past has  lately accepted a more 
relaxed attitude toward authenticity.
Holtorf (2005: 127) writes that authenticity is not a natural property of an artifact 
but the experience of their authenticity is  dictated by present contexts. He notes 
that artifacts  and heritage sites are material but their materiality (and therefore 
authenticity, I assume) is result of the relationship between people and things 
(Holtorf 2005: 127-129). All of Holtorf ’s reasoning can be seen to stem from the 
idea that the past is  a social construction that has relevance only in the present. 
Since I hold a materialist position, stating that there is  no clear distinction between 
material and immaterial33, Holtorf ’s statement sounds very materialist and 
relationalist (not relativist) to me. Materiality is indeed social mediation (see 
chapter IV) and therefore an important element when it comes to experiencing 
and consuming the past. Contrary to the idea of heritage as  inherently intangible 
and the experiencing of the past being based on experiencing values  and symbolic 
meanings (Smith 2006: 56), I believe it to be impossible to reduce material 
meanings to the level of  simple ideas or social constructions.
The idea of material objects as  separate from human beings  as subjects is a 
characteristically modern way of thinking (e.g. Thomas  2004a: 202). One man has 
been held responsible for this  kind of distinction, namely René Descartes 34. In 
addition to Descartes’ rationalism, Newton’s mechanistic worldview and Kant’s 
idea of synthetic a priori knowledge should be mentioned and seen as belonging 
to the same line of thought. A positivist and naturalist scientific ideal has until very 
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33 What ultimately exists is the mind. ‘Matter is effete mind’ (EP1: 293).
34  It must be noted that Descartes alone can not be held responsible for producing such 
distinctions, and even though in Meditations on first philosophy (Descartes  2002) he does write about 
the real distinction between mind and body and them being separate, he acknowledges  one can not 
survive without the other. Descartes’ work is  more about the relationship between mind and body 
rather than on their being separate.
recently dominated the conduct of archaeological inquiry and created an illusion 
of the natural sciences  as  the only pertinent and de facto scientific method. Only 
recently a new culture has arisen in archaeology; one that acknowledges  the world 
as  a system where objects are not characterized by their inherent attributes or 
qualities  but by their relations  to each other35. This relationalist view has not been 
widely acknowledged, since the essentialist ontology persists in archaeology.36
As I mentioned earlier, one way to reach the past is  by metaphor. Metaphor is  a 
way to link the contemporary meanings with those of the past (e.g. Moreland 
2010: 37-74). When based solely on metaphor, however, the real past may remain 
somewhat distant.37 That is why I believe in two kinds of authenticity. That of the 
metaphorical kind (the past being made), and that of historical kind (the real past 
as it is recorded into the material realm as everything that ever existed).
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35  Postprocessual archaeologies  emphasize the role of the individual above all and it (as an 
aggregate of archaeologies) became the archaeology of the individual level where the material 
culture is only used as an instrument rather than being studied as an essential element of social 
mediation. Postprocessual archaeology is a truly postmodern phenomenon as  it emphasizes  the 
subjective nature of knowing the truth about the past. That is  one reason material culture was left 
out of the account and not given enough consideration. Postprocessual archaeology takes the 
notion of the past being only a part of the present too literally. According to this maxim of 
postprocessual archaeology past meanings  can never be reached, and since no real past exists, the 
material culture should not be studied with the motive of  finding objective meanings.
Today there is a new field of archaeology emerging, called symmetrical archaeology (e.g. 
Olsen 2003: 88),  which can be seen as a pragmatistic archaeology where the material is again taken 
into account and the emphasis of study is not that much on the human but equally on both. The 
human is  an integral part of its  surroundings and should be treated as  such when studying it. In his 
book Archaeological semiotics, Robert Preucel (2006: 14) notes that ‘[o]ne of the most exciting 
developments in contemporary anthropology is  the revival of interest in material culture studies’. 
Material culture, including the archaeological record, has to regain its  reputation as an active 
participator in the everyday life.  For more on symmetrical archaeology see Olsen 2007 and Shanks 
2007.
36 Is  it then the context or perhaps our relation to objects  that makes them authentic? The idea of 
an authentic self, being true to one’s self,  can be applied in this  relationalist ontology. During the 
recent two decades or so, much emphasis  in archaeology has been placed on understanding objects 
of material culture as  persons. In this case the idea of objects as persons  is not a metaphor but an 
ontology, a way to characterize the nature of the world’s actual constituents. If it is possible to 
remain authentic as a person, it should be possible to identify objects as  authentic persons. ‘If 
objects and people are to be held in symmetry, what is an artifact?’ (Shanks 1998: 23). Thomas 
Yarrow (2003: 68-71) has noted that excavation is  transformative of both artifacts and people.  The 
objects are made artifacts in the process of their finding, while the objects simultaneously make the 
people who found them into archaeologists.
For more on relationalism in anthropology and archaeology, see also the works  of Tim 
Ingold (e.g. Ingold 2006, 2010).
37 Steen Larsen (1987: 197) writes that ‘[m]etaphors are not theories; they should not be expected to fit in every 
respect. The job of  a metaphor is to highlight features that are important in a given context of  use.’
I now declare the discussion of historical authenticity settled (but only to return to 
it in chapter IV) and concentrate on what I have referred to as  metaphorical 
authenticity (making and experiencing the past in the present). I argue that certain 
(if not all) metaphors  are understood by literal conventions  and affected by 
language change (Svanlund 2007: 85). Therefore changing conventions also affect 
the way the past is perceived by metaphor.
A case in point against the construction of the past based on systematic 
(contextual and fixed) metaphorical meanings  would be Ernie Lepore’s and 
Matthew Stone’s (2010) view against metaphorical meaning in language. Josef 
Stern (2000: 9-10) proposed that the understanding of a metaphor requires a 
knowledge of a certain context and thus  of the salient elements of the metaphor 
to understand its meaning, whereas  Lepore and Stone (2010: 170, 179), however, 
propose that the understanding of a metaphor is  based on understanding 
conventional literal meanings, rather than the peculiar process of metaphor 
meaning transference in relation to the context of  the utterer or interlocutor.38
Holtorf (2005: 119-121) states  that objects  are not old or authentic as such, but are 
made authentic ‘through particular, contextual conditions and processes  taking 
place in the present’.39 One frustrating point about Holtorf ’s reasoning is  that he 
never mentions the word convention in relation to his point about authenticity as 
contextual - a problem he should have issued!
The one time Holtorf (2005: 117) uses the word is in reference to Thomas Yarrow 
(2003: 68) when he writes that genuineness  of an object is created in social 
circumstances, such as conversations, i.e. corresponding to current conventions (!). 
Holtorf and Schadla-Hall (1999: 243) propose that aura and authenticity are 
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38  Hintikka and Sandu (1994: 153) propose that the understanding of a metaphor is based on 
possible-worlds semantics.  In order for a metaphor to be understood, ‘we need to understand its 
extensions under many kinds of circumstances besides  the actual one’ (Pietarinen 2008: 318). That 
is what experiencing the past is about. Constructing possible worlds.
39 A case of  possible-worlds semantics.
context-dependent, negotiated, and perhaps even decided upon, but they do not 
refer to the conventional nature of perceived authenticity. Holtorf ’s  (2010a: 37) 
statement ‘Authenticity is  in the eye of the beholder’ could be seen as a reference 
to convention in this sense, but he does not explicate it in any way.
This  could go to show that context and convention are hard to separate, which 
they often are (Oestigaard 2004: 35). There are, however, situations where the 
context (as a set of salient elements) is shared and the experience of authenticity is 
very different between two or more individuals.
One such situation would be an archaeological excavation. The professional 
archaeologists conducting the excavation have seen thousands of authentic 
archaeological artifacts and have very different standards  when it comes to 
experiencing their authenticity or aura. Students of archaeology enter the business 
with a desire for authenticity, desire in the sense Shanks (1992, 1995, 1998) has 
written about it. This  desire is quickly replaced by professional and analytic 
attitude toward the archaeological material. The students  conform to certain rules 
of the game (Lewis  1986: 107-118). Some, or perhaps  most, of this  conformation 
is done through imitating the more experienced archaeologists  who have learned 
the rules of conduct from their teachers (Lewis  1986: 118-121). In this sense the 
conventions of perceiving the authenticity of artifacts  are based on power of 
authority, as well as desire.
When non-archaeologists enter the site, they may marvel even the most abundant 
and everyday material that is being dug up. Optionally the audience may have a 
taste for more dramatic finds, in which case their attitude toward archaeologists 
may be disapproving when they are unable to satisfy the audience’s desire for 
grand finds. They, however, may experience authenticity in a totally different way. 
They conform to the particular conventions of a visitor on an archaeological 
excavation site and are often expected to stand in awe. This  is, of course, unless 
they are hoping to become professional archaeologists, in which case they conform 
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to the conventions  of the archaeologists and agree with them in that this and that 
material is pretty everyday and not that big of  a deal.
The previous chapter serves  as  a good example of a situation where the 
authenticity (aura, distance, pastness) of an object is perceived in many different 
ways in one context. Holtorf and Schadla-Hall (1999; see also Holtorf 2005) are 
correct in their notion of objects  being made authentic. The process, however, is 
different from what they propose. The context of an object does  not make it 
authentic, but the conventions  different groups of people have agreed, or rather 
conformed, to act according to. A culture seeking authenticity generates its  own 
conventions and generalities, commonplaces, and maxims (Trilling 1972: 105).
Summary
In this  chapter, I have approached the question of authenticity in archaeology. I 
started out by presenting some of the key concepts  through which the question of 
authenticity has  been approached in modern archaeology and which I take to be 
important, but I also wrote about what authenticity has  traditionally meant in 
archaeology. Basically it comes  down to two competing ontologies, and therefore 
two opposite attitudes toward knowing the past; the realist and the constructivist. 
In archaeology these are referred to as processual archaeology and postprocessual 
archaeology
I follow the popular trend in archaeology by making the distinction between 
historical authenticity (identifying artifacts with a particular time and place), and 
metaphorical authenticity, which deals more with experiencing the past and doing 
archaeology in the present and the magic they convey. I argued that experiencing 
the past can be understood by such metaphors as tourism, theatre, and time travel. 
Of these time travel is  a notion worthy of more study, and it has  not been widely 
discussed in archaeology.
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After the chapter on experiencing the past, I turned to discussing the process of 
experiencing the pastness of things, namely aura, and how the pastness of 
reproductions  can be experienced. Again, I propose that certain historically 
‘authentic’ artifacts are more often than not of more value to professional 
archaeologists than the wider public, while ‘fake’ artifacts can deliver similar 
experiences  of authenticity. This  is due to the metaphorical meanings the 
experiencing of the past and archaeology are based on. These metaphors  deal 
more with the process of doing archaeology than they do with producing objective 
knowledge of  the past.
I argued that the past is  constantly being made and therefore rather than 
irreplaceable, cultural heritage is reproducible. This  leads to questions concerning 
the value of archaeological material. Again, maintaining that historical and 
metaphorical authenticity do not exclude each other’s importance and relevance 
for experiencing the past, or knowing more about the past for that matter, I turned 
to presenting my own idea of  the processes behind the production of  authenticity.
Diverging from the common view in archaeology, I propose, drawing my 
inspiration from philosophy of language, that rather than context, conventions are 
what govern the authentic experience of the past. I began the chapter with an 
introduction to contextuality and hermeneutics  in archaeology and then explained 
what I mean with conventionality. I presented an example of a situation where the 
authenticity of an artifact can be experienced differently in one context by persons 
conforming to alternate conventions or habits  of acting. The habits action is based 
on may be very much tied to long-term history, or they can be more conventional 
and based on individual intentions and authoritative power.
The authenticity of artifacts and monumental sites, authentic and fake, is  based on 
the production of an authentic past; a process in which both professional 
archaeologists and popular culture have an important role. The production of an 
authentic past can be done by gathering archaeological material on excavations by 
professional archaeologists, or in popular culture by the way archaeology and the 
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past are presented and dealt with in movies, literature, games, architecture, and 
art. Authenticity is therefore always  a material product deeply rooted in the 
material objects of the past, as  well as a conventional social and ideological 
construct open to constant recontextualisation.
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IV
AUTHENTICITY AS SEMIOSIS
Authenticity as material meanings, materiality, and semiosis
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued that authenticity is  not a contextual attribute, but 
a convention, a habit of acting. There is  a basis  for that action in the material 
world (Danesi 1996: 37). That action is not only based on constant social 
recontextualisation but has  its  roots  in the material world as a sign system that sits 
ready for us  to study and interpret. It is a web of signs and references (Olsen 2010: 
155). It is a meaning-making practice (the process of assigning meaning to things 
via interpreting them as signs of something and creating new signs, thus creating 
semiosis) based on objects in the real world, the sign for which they stand for, and 
the interpretation made from those signs.
In this  chapter, I will present a theory of sign by Charles Peirce. I argue that 
authenticity is  synonymous  to meaning. Meaning in turn is  the total sum of all 
uses  and interpretations  of a sign. The whole meaning of an object, and therefore 
its authenticity, can be understood by studying an object as a sum of its  meanings. 
An object therefore can have various meanings in the present, just like Cornelius 
Holtorf (e.g. 2005) has argued. The observation, that the past only exists in the 
present, is based on the fact that the whole meaning of an object is in the way it is 
used in the present. That meaning, however, is affected by the past meanings  and 
uses  of the object, as  well as the possible future meanings and uses  of it. These 
possible meanings  are constructed by knowing the past and present meanings of 
an object. Archaeology is  about studying the past meanings of an object, its 
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historicity in the present. That chain of meanings and references, and knowledge 
in and of  it, I call semiosis 40. Authenticity to me therefore is material semiosis.41
In my view the two lines of thought in the so-called postprocessual archaeology 
are the structuralist view of signification, and the pragmatistic take on the 
meanings of things42. Therefore, in this chapter, I will explain why and how 
semiotics  got introduced into archaeology, how the two main scientific discourses 
in humanities, the structuralist and the pragmatist, differ from each other and how 
semiotics  can be applied in order to provide a systematic approach to the study of 
authenticity. I will present and apply the Peircean theory of sign and show how 
authenticity is, in effect, produced as a byproduct in the process  of assigning 
meaning to material objects  as signs  of the past. In addition to using the Peircean 
sign theory, I argue that the study of  material metaphor is needed.
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40 See also for example Winchkler 1996: 356.
41  Edwina Taborsky (1998: 3) gives the following interesting, however extensive, definition for 
semiosis: ‘All life is organized energy. That includes not simply atoms and molecules - the merest specks of matter 
before us - but also all the more complex forms of energy, such as plants and animals, human beings and their 
societies. Energy is the basis of all life, energy is the power to make work, it is the power to “make something.” There 
is only one things that energy desires, and that is to exist, in any form whatsoever. In order to exist, energy must be 
organized into a “packet” of finite energy; it must be a sign. Signs are spatiotemporally closed codifications of 
energy.; any and all existential realities are signs - a molecule, a proton, a bird, a human being, a word, a thought, a 
gesture, a society. Semiosis is not “words about reality,” but is reality itself; and takes place within architectures, 
which are organized regimes of  knowledge.’
42  According to Robert Preucel (2006: 6),  modern semiotics  is characterized by two distinct 
trajectories, Saussurean linguistics and the philosophical pragmatism of Charles Peirce. I share his 
view completely. The reason this very same distinction can be made in archaeology is due to the 
dramatic rise in the use of linguistic theories  that happened in humanities, and archaeology, in the 
1970s and 1980s due to the works of such scholars  as Claude Lévi-Strauss and Roland Barthes 
(Preucel and Mrozovski 2010: 21). This shift in humanities  is often referred to as the linguistic turn. 
Pragmatism, or the use of Peircean semiotics to be more precise, on the other hand,  came into 
picture a little later after much of Charles Peirce’s  texts  became widely available toward the end of 
the 1990s. During his life, Peirce only published short articles and the vast majority of his texts 
(comprising over 100,000 pages) remain unpublished even today (De Waal 2001: 3).
Semiotics of  authenticity
The concept of authenticity, I argue, is  very closely related to the semiotic 
treatment of material culture, and, despite the difficulties a semiotic archaeology43 has 
faced, I think a semiotic model can be used to explain what authenticity is  and 
how it manifests in material culture (and archaeology).
The reason authenticity remains a ‘red herring’ (Bruner 2005: 5) is the lack of 
systematic approach to the topic. One such attempt has  been the application of 
Saussurean structuralist or poststructuralist semiotics of which one can find 
multiple examples  throughout the recent history of archaeology (e.g. Bapty and 
Yates 1990, Hodder 1986, Shanks  1992, Shanks and Tilley 1987, Tilley 1990, 
1991). The Saussurean binary model of the sign as composed of the signifier and 
the signified will lead to a very fixed and static view of the material realm (Preucel 
and Bauer 2001: 86; Waal 2001: 70). I will return to and explain this model 
further in the text.
The reason Saussurean linguistics  became very influential in archaeology (in forms 
of structuralism and poststructuralism) is  linked to the fact that in his  linguistics, 
Saussure, for the first time, set out to construct a scientific and systematic approach 
to language, and all of human thought for that matter (Hénault 2010: 101). This 
idea of a scientific and systematic conduct is  in concurrence with the natural 
scientific approach to studying the past and knowing something certain about a 
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43 The Swedish archaeologist Johan Normark, has  noted that the treatment of material culture as 
signs (semiotic archaeology) is  part of postprocessual archaeology. This may be the case with most 
semiotic archaeologies, and very true since archaeology can still be seen mainly to be 
postprocessual. In fact, most of the Finnish archaeology is still culture history or processual 
archaeology. Normark’s  attempt, however, is to move beyond postprocessual archaeology. Normark 
calls  his archaeology neomaterialist, or posthumanocentric,  object oriented archaeology (Normark 
2010). He sets out to discard the concept of  culture altogether! (See also Immonen 2010: 80-82.)
real past. The need for an applicable scientific model in humanities is linked to the 
ideal of  natural sciences as the science.44
A refreshing alternative has been offered by some archaeologists (e.g. Bauer 2002; 
Lele 2006; Liebmann et al. 2005; Preucel 2006; Preucel and Bauer 2001). Preucel 
and Bauer (2001: 87) have noted that the Saussurean view of sign is  ‘outmoded’. 
They suggest the use of a Peircean model for the semiotic study of material 
culture. Peircean pragmatism, as opposed to Saussurean structuralism, in their 
view, is  especially suitable for the archaeological study of material culture. In fact, 
Preucel (2006) bases  his archaeology (or anthropology) solely on Peircean semiotics 
and pragmatism.
Archaeology, as  I already stated above, is  interested in the long-term meanings  of 
objects (Hodder 1986: 80; Preucel and Bauer 2001: 94). Long-term meaning, in 
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44 Archaeology uses  a lot of the methods  of natural sciences but is not itself a natural science per se. 
The structuralist aspirations to find out universal laws governing language and therefore all human 
understanding was a notion fit for the science driven processual archaeology. The notions of 
’science’  (as natural sciences) and ‘law’ were tried to fit into archaeology as part of the processual 
discourse, unfortunately with little or no success. It did not take long for archaeologists to realize 
that no such laws can be found to accord with human behavior (Olsen 2007: 582). The structuralist 
notion of a system, according to which social changes happen, took a dead end (Preucel and Bauer 
2001: 87).
Postprocessual archaeology has been called a relativist science where ‘anything 
goes’ (Oestigaard 2004: 35), and is atheoretical. Robert Dunnell (1992) identifies two reasons for 
archaeology's failure in becoming scientific: (i) taking physics as a model for science (processual 
archaeology), and (ii) common sense (already, according to Dunnell,  seen in processual archaeology 
but particularly so in postprocessual archaeologies). According to Dunnell, the postprocessual era 
can be seen as  somewhat atheoretical. There has  been a 150 year long quest for a scientific method 
in archaeology, but what scientific means  has  not been defined accurately enough. According to 
Dunnell,  using common sense does  not advance archaeology as  a science. Archaeology needs a 
theory of its  own, that is  at the moment missing. Dunnell, however, believes such theory can be 
found or constructed. To him a scientific archaeology would be a falsificative archaeology. The 
power of such science lies precisely in the theory’s ability to become falsified. Dunnell labels 
cultural evolution and constructivism as  particularly common-sensist, that are based on too big 
hypotheses that are too hard to falsify,. On the other hand, they are based on a view of culture that 
is  tied to the researcher’s own culture. Physics can not be taken as the ideal science since 
archaeology is history, not natural science. (Dunnell 75-89.)
With his notion of archaeology as atheoretical Dunnell, I think,  is on the right track. 
Postprocessual archaeology can be seen as the relativist archaeology where anything goes. The 
failure in finding universal laws resulted in an emergence of a bundle of archaeologies in the 80’s. 
In a way archaeology went from one extreme to another, but to call these archaeologies 
categorically atheoretical is  somewhat misleading. Charles  Peirce called his pragmatism (or 
pragmaticism and scientific inquiry) critical common-sensism. Dunnell is comfortable calling 
archaeology atheoretical and referring to common sense as one of the reasons for archaeology’s 
failure in becoming scientific. I, however,  think that it is the Peircean notion of ‘common sense’ 
that holds in it the very possibility of  a scientific archaeology.
my view, is  one of the key factors in explaining authenticity. The long-term 
meanings in turn can be studied by using a sign theory by Charles Peirce.
Peirce’s  model of sign as a tripartite structure, as  opposed to the Saussurean 
binary model, is  a dynamic model that takes the human into account more 
effectively. The reason the Peircean model seems  more applicable to me is  not, 
however, some malign simplicity of the Saussurean method. To say that the 
structural model of sign does not provide a sufficient model for studying material 
culture would be simplifying the Saussurean school. That is not the case nor my 
objective. There is  a more profound reason for the differences between these two 
schools. That is the degree in which thought and language are seen to be 
interconnected. In the Saussurean tradition, all human thought is  taken to revolve 
around language. That means  there is  no way to think outside of language. People 
are prisoners of language so to speak. In the pragmatist tradition, however, 
language is seen as secondary to thought.
These two views of the relationship between thought and language are the 
fundamental difference between the structuralist and the pragmatist outlooks. The 
Saussurean theory of sign was designed, since language was thought to govern all 
thought, to apply to language, whereas  Peirce maintains that material objects 
(including written texts) can be experienced outside and independent of language; 
thinking can be diagrammatic or otherwise based on images (Short 2007: 4). In 
fact, Peirce goes  as  far as  stating that everything, from feelings to persons and 
ultimately the whole universe, is a sign (e.g. Waal 2001: 70). This could be seen as 
one of the downsides of the Peircean theory of sign. It explains  too much, 
ultimately ending up explaining nothing. (Susan Haack, personal communiqué 
10.9.2010.)
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Peirce’s theory of  sign
Authenticity is strongly connected to the way material objects acquire meaning 
through time. At the heart of Peirce’s semiotics is  continuity, historicity, and the 
accumulation of knowledge through time (e.g. Houser 2010: 90; Lele 2006: 50; 
Parker 1998; Waal 2001: 40-42). The question, then, to be asked is how can we 
reach the past material meanings. The structuralist approach would lead to the 
treatment of material objects  (as signs  of the past) and their meanings  as  arbitrary 
and highly contextual since they are constantly being assigned new meanings  in 
the present. This is  a very fixed and static view of sign processes. The view of sign 
as  a dyadic relation between the signifier (object) and the signified (the concept) 
does  not have built in it the notion of never ending semiosis, which in turn takes 
the interpretant (the notion of a human interpreter) into account. That is 
appealing in Peirce's  theory of sign. The Saussurean model of sign will not, as 
such, provide the historical aspect of meaning-making processes  needed for 
studying the past meanings. I think Robert Preucel (2006: 247) puts it well: ‘[I]t is 
possible to show that archaeology is  a pragmatic discourse constituted by 
meaning-making practices in the present that systematically articulate with the 
past meaning-making practices.’
As pointed out above, material culture differs  from language. Peirce's theory of 
sign differs  from the Saussurean one in that a sign is not thought of as  a dyadic but 
as  a triadic relation between a sign vehicle (S), the object (O) and the interpretant 
(I) (Waal 2001: 71) (figure 1). Saussure thought of signs as profoundly lingual 
(Hénault 2010: 101), whereas for Peirce, lingual signs  (letters, words, sentences, 
sounds, utterances...) are only certain kind of signs (Bauer 2002: 39; Short 2007: 
5).
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Figure 1. The three placed model of sign by Charles Peirce. A sign is constituted of the sign-vehicle (S), 
the object (O), and the interpretant (I). Semiosis is triadic cooperation of the sign, the object, and the 
interpretant. The two-placed relationship between the sign-vehicle and the object can be divided into iconic 
relation, indexical relation, or symbolic relation. Semiosis is the action of interpreting a sign, thus creating 
a new one in the process. (Drawing by Marko Marila)
In Peirce's theory of sign (into which it is  not necessary to provide an extensive 
introduction since one is  easily accessible45), the two placed46 relationship between 
the sign vehicle and the object can be iconic, indexical, and symbolic (Houser 
2010: 92). Iconic signs  share a certain kind of similarity with the object. A 
footprint is an iconic sign for a foot (e.g. Parker 1998: 146). These types of signs 
are not conventional, and their interpretation will be the same now as  it was a 
thousand years ago. Indexical signs are pointers or indicators. This  type of sign-
object relation is  also non-arbitrary. The often used example of indexical signs  is 
the indicative relation between a weathervane and the direction of the wind (e.g. 
Short 2007: 233). Symbolic signs, however, are conventional and agreed upon 
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45 See for example Short 2007.
46 We are here dealing with sign components  rather than signs since a two placed sign relation will 
not induce semiosis, but a three placed (S+O+I) relation is needed. Peirce called two placed 
relations  degenerate signs since they do not provide any information (EP2: 162, 171-172). They 
are, in effect, not part of  semiosis. (EP2 refers to Peirce Edition Project 1998.)
(Waal 2001: 74). This is the reason past symbolic meanings are hard or impossible 
to reach or reconstruct.
Meaning in objects has  to be seen as a diachronic process  of semiosis where a sign 
is always in relation to a context as the practical consequences it produces. 
Materiality does not convey a static image of past social identities of humans  as 
proposed by relations between material objects in archaeological assemblages. 
Materiality is social mediation and an unending meaning-making practice (Preucel 
and Bauer 2001: 92). Meaning is not, indeed, only in the thing itself, but it is also 
in the use context of an object. We will, however, have to take a look at the long 
term use and meanings of an object and only then can we say what the whole of 
the meaning of an object really is. This can be obtained by studying objects as 
signs in the Peircean way and placing them in the chain of unending semiosis 
(EP2: 411; Waal 2001: 71).
Picture 1. Anthropomorphic clay vessels at the museum of cultural history in Oslo, Norway. Note the little 
nose on the smaller pot on the right. (Photograph by Marko Marila 2009)
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In addition to reaching the meaning of an object, the pragmatistic model, or 
theory, can help ascertain material functions. The function of an object has  been 
and still is  the object of extensive studying in archaeology. Function and meaning 
are, to a great extent, two inseparable aspects of an object. The meaning of an 
object can be seen as an assemblage of its  functions, and the function of an object 
on the other hand as the present meaning, the practical agency of  the object.
Material metaphor
I have discussed the use of the Peircean theory of sign and concentrated on the 
three levels of sign-object relation, the iconic, indexical, and symbolic. In addition 
to this, the study of solid metaphor is  needed. Only then can we get closer to the 
past symbolic meanings.
Iconic and indexical relations  can be seen in the material culture which may have 
been buried in the ground for extended periods  of time, but past symbolic 
relations  have been lost when the objects  were left out of the semiotic meaning 
transference process. Using material metaphor, we can get closer to the symbolic 
meanings, but not reach them altogether. The whole of the meaning of an object 
can only be attained in the present by studying its  past and present, and possible 
future meanings.
A convenient method, then, is  to use material or solid metaphors, as  also proposed 
by Christopher Tilley (1999), and Lele (2006: 65-67) who aims to connect 
language and the material culture with material metaphor. Material metaphors 
are based on certain similarities in materials. Wine and blood share certain 
attributes and it is therefore not entirely arbitrary that wine and color red is the 
symbol for blood, whereas color white can be associated with milk or semen 
(Tilley 1999: 265). Anthropomorphic relations, as well, are non-arbitrary. There is 
a bodily basis for (material) metaphor, and all meaning for that matter (Johnson 
1987: 65). The human body can be seen as a container of intestines and fluids. In 
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certain contexts  pots  and other containers have been given an anthropomorphic 
shape (picture 1). Solid metaphors  are therefore likely to take on meanings  in a 
way different from lingual metaphors  or metonyms. Lingual metaphors, like all 
metaphors, are based on similarities or an iconic relationship between two or more 
entities  (Pietarinen 2008: 317-318)47. Solid metaphors, however, are constrained to 
similarities in material attributes. This does not mean that material metaphor is 
based solely on iconic relations or similitude. Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (2008: 318) 
writes that
[s]imilarity may be qualitative, structural or functional. Hence it can 
be abstract and intellectual, and need not be based only in closeness in 
looks or in some visual or sensuous features.
Material forms, unlike words, are not only communicating meanings  but actively 
doing something. They take active part in the interplay between humans in social 
meaning-making practices. They are a physical part of the Peircean never-ending 
semiosis. Liebmann et al. (2005: 48) have taken a somewhat similar approach in 
their studies  of the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 in New Mexico. Their studies  are based 
on iconic and indexical relations between objects:
It can be argued that material culture, including Pueblo architecture, 
carries  much of its meaning through iconic and indexical properties. 
These levels of meaning are often less ambiguous than symbolic 
properties. Many signs are not arbitrary because their elements have 
definite relations  to their referents. While it is true that the meanings  of 
signs may change, the iconic and indexical components  of signs are 
more fixed than symbolic meanings. (Liebmann et al. 2005: 48)
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47  Caution is  called for here. In chapter III, I proposed that lingual metaphors are also based on 
lingual conventions. This is one important distinction between lingual and material metaphor to be 
kept in mind.  Material metaphor is also based on iconicity,  but involves indexicality in that it, in its 
material nature, is a forced representation of  reality.
It is their view that by analyzing the iconic and indexical relations  and the 
syntactical measures of architecture more could be learnt about social changes, 
identity and ideology (Liebmann et al. 2005: 48). As pointed by Ulrich Veit (2007: 
99), Liebmann and his associates have mainly used historical data as their 
evidence and it remains  unclear whether the symbolic meanings  could be attained 
purely through the study of archaeological material remains. I argue that it is not 
possible with the help of only the iconic and indexical relations  of signs, but solid 
metaphors are vital when reconstructing past symbolic meanings. Ahti-Veikko 
Pietarinen (2008: 319) has  noticed that ‘the materiality of metaphors  is  found in 
the fact that meanings  are always  grounded in the actual world or in one of the 
possible worlds, including worlds of fiction’. That means  the meaning of an object 
can not only be grounded to its past and present meanings, but also to the notion 
of  its possible future meanings.
Peirce’s  theory of sign is  useful when assessing the meaning of objects by their 
iconic and indexical value. When assessing symbolic meanings, however, a study of 
material metaphor is  needed. Material or solid metaphors lie somewhere between 
iconicity and symbolic meaning. It may not ever be possible to reach past symbolic 
meanings, but material metaphor will take us closer (table 1).
Present Inference process Past
Symbolic
Solid
metaphor
Symbolic
Indexical → Indexical
Iconic = Iconic
Table 1. Peirce's sign-object relation as applied in the process of reaching past meanings. Past symbolic 
meanings can be attained by using solid, material metaphor, whereas indexical signs are based on law-like 
causalities, and iconic signs on resemblance.
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Summary
The poststructuralist text metaphor discussed in chapter II, authenticity and 
postmodernism, I argue, is  not applicable in the study of past meaning-making 
processes. Remaining loyal to the structuralist tradition, Tilley (1991: 105) sees 
signs as always acquiring their meaning through relations, and in the Lévi-
Straussian way, mostly by binary relations. Reading the past, as  a method 
proposed by, for example, Ian Hodder (1986) at least when meaning is based on 
binary structural relations  like in their work, is  not pertinent to the study of 
materiality.
The formation of meaning in objects  has  to be seen as a diachronic process where 
a sign is always in relation to a context as the practical consequences it produces. 
Materiality does not convey a static image of past social identities of humans  as 
proposed by relations between material objects in archaeological assemblages. 
Materiality is social mediation and an unending meaning-making practice. 
Meaning, indeed, is not in the thing itself, but it is  in the use context of an object. 
We will have to take a look at the long term use and meanings of an object and 
only then can we say what the whole of the meaning of an object really is. This 
can be obtained by studying objects as signs in the Peircean way and placing them 
in the chain of unending semiosis, the process  of interpreting signs and creating 
new ones. Materiality as  social mediation to me is  unending semiosis  in the 
Peircean sense.
Meaning is  not entirely confined to the present. Meaning can be seen as  a 
historical continuity. It is  worth noticing that the present is a notion constituted by 
the past and the future. Meaning is therefore in relation to the future as  in what 
things could become, not only in what they have been and what they are. To reach 
past material meanings, the historical gaps  in the archaeological record need to be 
filled by reconstructing the infinite, unending semiotic process, semiosis. 
Archaeology therefore is  the science of reconstructing the chain of interpretations 
called semiosis.
70
V
DISCUSSION
Trilling’s (1972) notion of staying true to one’s  self is  a modern maxim of 
authenticity and as  such has influenced modern archaeology that seeks to know 
the real past as it once happened. The fact that authenticity has been treated 
totally differently in postprocessual archaeology is due to its  postmodern 
influences. Postmodernism rejects  the possibility of authenticity and is  more 
concerned with meaning as a synchronic rather than a diachronic process. In 
postmodernism, then, objects  are not real or original. There is no authentic since 
the original is already a copy (Deleuze 1968).
Much of postprocessual archaeology rests on these notions. Deep in the ethos of 
postprocessual archaeology are the following notions: the past only exists  in the 
present; the present is simulation and therefore the past can be experienced by 
simulating it, often by visiting theme parks, or in popular culture by reliving the 
past through imagery48. That is why the metaphorical nature of the past is  a 
recurring theme in postprocessual popular archaeology. Archaeology deals  with 
very potent metaphors such as  digging, layers, depth, truth, time travel, detective 
work, and adventure (e.g. Holtorf 2005, 2007; Marila 2011b; Shanks 1992). In 
postprocessual archaeology, metaphors  have been dealt with in respect to 
experiencing the past. It has been said that the past can be reached by metaphor 
(e.g. Holtorf 2005, 2007; Moreland 2010: 37-74; Shanks  1992, 1995, 1998). 
Metaphor, on the other hand, has been treated as a contextual trope that has truth 
value only in one context (e.g. Larsen 1987).
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48 ‘If we were to take as the finest allegory of simulation the Borges tale where the cartographers of the Empire draw 
up a map so detailed that it ends up exactly covering the territory (but where, with the decline of the Empire this map 
becomes frayed and finally ruined, a few sherds still discernible in the deserts - the metaphysical beauty of this ruined 
abstraction, bearing witness to an imperial pride and rotting like a carcass, returning to the substance of the soil, 
rather as an aging double ends up being confused with the real thing), this fable would then have come full circle for 
us, and now has nothing but the discrete charm of  second-order simulacra.’ (Baudrillard 1988: 166.)
The most prominent figure in recent discussion of authenticity in archaeology has 
been Cornelius Holtorf. His  works  deal with authenticity as  inherently a 
contextual attribute, i.e. as a symbolic and arbitrary representation of the past that 
only has truth value in one context. For Holtorf, there exist no real past since ‘the’ 
past is only a social construction of the present. This  approach has upset some 
realist archaeologists, among them Kristian Kristiansen, who see the relativist 
approach to compromise the role of past material culture as  the object of scientific 
study. A good example of this discussion was  provided in the introduction of this 
thesis (chapter I). In a way, the relativist jargon idealizes  the past and therefore 
evades  real problems, just like existentialism according to Adorno did when 
idealizing the human subject.
Since it may remain somewhat ambiguous whether I agree or disagree with 
Cornelius Holtorf on some particular issues, it  is  perhaps  worthwhile to explicate 
my relationship with his writings. Cornelius Holtorf has influenced my thinking 
greatly. He is  correct in his notion of archaeology being popular culture. He is 
correct when he points that the relationship between now and then is of a 
metaphorical kind. Archaeology and its  meanings may be part of popular culture, 
but archaeology as a science has also objectives, motives, and questions  that 
originate from within science, not entirely from the society in which archaeology 
as  a science operates. Archaeology therefore is  not entirely in service of popular 
culture. Nor is  the past only reachable through metaphor. Metaphors may be 
relevant when discussing the role of archaeology in contemporary popular culture, 
but not when it comes to knowing the real past. There need to be made a 
distinction between what is  real and what exists. Contrary to what Holtorf 
(Holtorf and Piccini 2009: 14) has  written, it may be argued that the past does not 
exist in the present, it is real. This, however, is  a complicated matter and need not 
be discussed further here. Suffice it to say that I disagree with Holtorf on the 
ontological level about the nature of reality, but agree on what he has written 
about the meaning and significance of archaeology in popular culture on the 
metaphorical level.
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Drawing my inspiration from philosophy of language (Lewis 1986), I argue that 
authenticity, as a metaphorical attribute, is  not contextual, but conventional and 
habitual and can be experienced diversely by multiple individuals  in one context. 
Authenticity is therefore a social habit of acting that has its  roots in the material 
world and materiality. Materiality is ‘social’ mediation of objects  (humans and 
other). Objects  in turn have meaning. Their whole meaning (authenticity, I argue) 
can be studied by imagining what possible practical consequences their presence 
might have had in the past, has in the present, and could have in the future in the 
system of objects. The whole meaning of an object as a Peircean sign therefore is 
the total sum of  the consequences of  its uses.
An object may have had very different meanings  in the past and in the present, 
but this does not mean that we have to settle with knowing only the object’s 
meaning in the present. An object’s meanings can be studied through a rigorous 
scientific inquiry. The object of that study is the chain of references  known as 
semiosis.49 Of course, the scientific inquiry itself is  part of semiosis. That is  why 
semiosis is also accumulation of  knowledge.
The conduct of scientific inquiry is, however, painfully slow and hard. We may 
never know what the objects meant to the past people (some information will 
inevitably remain buried secrets), but we must keep doing our best to do so. Matthew 
Johnson (1999: 114) puts  it  well: ‘[A]rchaeology is very difficult.’ In fact, I would 
like to go as far as suggesting that the Peircean pragmatistic attitude toward 
knowing the past may well become the next scientific archaeology50. Like Charles 
Percy Snow (1998: vii-viii) wrote already in the 1960s about the sciences having 
been divided into two cultures, ‘the literary intellectuals’ and the natural scientists, 
there exist two cultures also in archaeology. There are on the one hand those who 
believe in the natural sciences as  the true scientific method, and on the other hand 
those who see archaeology as humanism; or processualists and postprocessualists 
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49  Preucel and Mrozowski (2010: 16) propose that the view that things mediate social relations 
underpins a new development in semiotic archaeology.
50 Something very similar has been proposed by Preucel and Mrozowski (2010: 28-34).
in paradigmatic terms. Both cultures share what Snow (1998: viii) called ‘a 
profound mutual suspicion and incomprehension’. This  is  where archaeology is 
now. There has, however, been much discussion of what is going to be the next 
scientific ‘paradigm’ of  archaeology.
Because I do not believe there has  ever been a true paradigmatic shift in 
archaeology in the Kuhnian (1964) sense, the new pragmatistic archaeology could 
be understood as a synthesis between processual archaeology and postprocessual 
archaeology - a new scientific attitude and the new possibility of a scientific 
archaeology. According to Preucel and Mrozowski (2010: 33), who also strive for a 
pragmatistic archaeology, studying the past is  based on a science that is diverse in 
methods, as  well as epistemology. The disunity of science need to be seen as  its 
strength, not as its  weakness. Pragmatistic archaeology will seek answers to the 
same questions that have always been the moving force in the conduct of 
archaeological inquiry. 
Pragmatistic archaeology is a combination of methods from the systematic natural 
sciences and humanities, mainly Peircean semiotics  (Preucel and Mrozowski 2010: 
32). It is courage to propose small questions, and courage to occasionally err and 
still have faith in science. It is  motivated by the melioristic idea of the 
accumulation of knowledge, however painfully slow it may seem. This  is  to imply 
that pragmatism is  a work in process. It is  an attitude, not a scientific method. In 
pragmatistic archaeology both hedgehogs and foxes  (see prologue) will have a 
common goal of assessing the whole meaning of things, having knowledge of the 
world, and finding out the truth.
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SUMMARY
In this master’s thesis, I have discussed the question of authenticity in 
postprocessual archaeology. Modern archaeology is a product of the modern 
world, and postprocessual archaeology in turn is strongly influenced by 
postmodernism. The way authenticity has been understood in processual 
archaeology is largely dictated by the modern condition. The understanding of 
authenticity in postprocessual archaeology, however, rests  on notions of simulation 
and metaphor.
It has  been argued by postprocessual archaeologists that the past can be 
experienced by metaphor, and that the relationship between now and then is  of a 
metaphorical kind. In postprocessual archaeology, authenticity has been said to be 
contextual. This view has been based on a contextualist understanding of the 
meanings of language and metaphor. I argue that, besides  being based on 
metaphor, authenticity is a conventional attribute based on habits of acting, which 
in turn have their basis  in the material world and the materiality of objects. 
Authenticity is  material meaning, and that meaning can be found out by studying 
the objects as  signs  in a chain of signification called semiosis. Authenticity 
therefore is semiosis.
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